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SHOW US THE MONEY: HOW PATCHWORK
STATE FREEDOM-OF-INFORMATION LAWS
IMPEDE ACCOUNTABILITY IN HIGH SCHOOL
ATHLETICS
By Frank D. LoMonte ∗ and Harrison O’Keeffe ∗∗

I.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

High school sports, particularly high school football, are an integral element
of the American educational experience. School-sponsored competitive sports in the
United States draw an estimated 8 million participants every year. 1 Over 1.03 million
high schoolers play tackle football alone, making it the most-played interscholastic
sport. 2 The number of high schoolers participating in school-sponsored athletics has
grown every year over the past decade, according to the National Federation of State
High School Associations, an umbrella entity for state-level governing bodies.
High school athletics are a matter of public concern because of their
benefits, their risks, and their outsized cultural significance. Because sporting events
reliably draw crowds and media attention, athletics have become a venue for social
and political debate. Athletes kneel in solidarity with victims of police brutality. 3
Cheerleaders and coaches fight for the right to engage in religious expression in
conjunction with sporting events. 4 And currently, the rights of transgender students
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1. NAT’L FED’N OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, 2017–18 HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC PARTICIPATION
SURVEY 54 (2018), https://www.nfhs.org/media/1020205/2017-18_hs_participation_survey.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HZ2B-PUE2]. Note that “participants” means that some individuals are double-counted
because they compete in more than one sport.
2. See id. at 53.
3. See Evie Blad, Taking a Stand: How Schools Should Respond to National-Anthem Protests,
EDUC. WEEK (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2016/10/05/taking-a-stand-howschools-should-respond.html [https://perma.cc/TBU9-YSR8] (documenting multiple instances of high
school athletes kneeling during the National Anthem inspired by the example of NFL quarterback Colin
Kaepernick, whose silent protest followed a string of highly publicized killings of African-Americans at
the hands of police).
4. See Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, NO. 09–13–00251–CV, 2017 WL
4319908 (Tex. App. Sept. 28, 2017) (finding that “run-through” banners displayed by cheerleaders at the
start of football games are the private speech of the individual student creators and not “government
speech”). In 2018, a Bremerton, Washington, football coach petitioned the Supreme Court to hear his First
Amendment case, after he was disciplined for kneeling and praying on the field immediately after a game
in view of his students. Chris Henry, Coach Kennedy Asks U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Bremerton School
SUN
(June
26,
2018,
12:48
PM),
Prayer
Case,
KITSAP
https://www.kitsapsun.com/story/news/local/2018/06/26/bremerton-school-prayer-case-coach-joekennedy-supreme-court/734402002/ [https://perma.cc/TCW3-A5FB]. A split panel of the Ninth Circuit
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are being fought out in the stadiums and arenas of the public school system. 5 For all
of these reasons, the public has a manifest interest in being informed about—and
having input into—the way interscholastic sports are run.
The governance of high school athletics falls into a gray nether zone of the
law. In every state and the District of Columbia, a statewide umbrella organization,
typically referred to as a High School Athletic Association or HSAA, sets and
enforces standards for participation in competitive interscholastic sports. These
organizations are neither strictly private nor strictly public. While nominally
incorporated as not-for-profit corporations, they enjoy many of the benefits of
governmental status. Regardless of the many indicators pointing in favor of
“governmental” status, HSAAs typically have resisted being categorized as “public,”
which would obligate them to open their board meetings and disclose their records
to the public. Legal battles have been waged across the country over access to
information that athletic associations prefer to keep secret, with mixed outcomes for
the requesters. 6
Just as state laws entitle journalists and citizen watchdogs to obtain records
and attend meetings to oversee other aspects of education policymaking, the public
should have a clear entitlement to know how decisions involving school athletic
programs are made. As one commentator has observed, “Even the American legal
system recognizes that athletic participation plays an integral part in a school’s
educational mission.” 7 Simply put, sports are too costly, too dangerous, and too
central to the educational experience of millions of young people for policy decisions
to be made in the dark.
As the adverse health consequences of playing professional football became
widespread public knowledge, 8 attention turned to the frequency of head injuries in
found no constitutional violation in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 869 F.3d 813, 831 (9th Cir.
2017).
5. See Michael Lenzi, The Trans Athlete Dilemma: A Constitutional Analysis of High School
Transgender Student-Athlete Policies, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 841, 871–74 (2018) (collecting cases in which
students have sued for the right to play on single-sex scholastic teams other than those corresponding to
their biological sex); see also Malika Andrews, How Should High Schools Define Sexes for Transgender
Athletes?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/08/sports/transgenderathletes.html [https://perma.cc/7WLQ-K6VB] (describing cases in Texas and Indiana in which students
have fought to be allowed to compete on teams matching their gender identity, and how governing bodies
have had difficulty adapting their rules).
6. See infra Section B.1. (collecting rulings and interpretations applying state open-governments
laws to athletic associations).
7. Morgan Shell, Transgender Student-Athletes in Texas School Districts: Why Can’t the UIL Give
All Students Equal Playing Time?, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1043, 1052–53 (2016); see also Fla. High Sch.
Activities Ass’n, Inc. v. Bryant, 313 So. 2d 57, 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (quoting the trial court’s
finding about the important of playing high school basketball to the student plaintiff: “[I]t is an important
and vital part of his life providing an impetus to his general scholastic and social development and
rehabilitation from his prior problems as a juvenile delinquent. It has resulted in the improvement of his
grades, attitude, self-confidence, discipline and maturity.”).
8. A 2009 article in GQ about the work of emergency-room doctor Bennet Omalu in raising
awareness about the frequency of traumatic brain injury in the National Football League inspired a 2015
feature film, “Concussion,” starring Will Smith. See generally Jeanne Marie Laskas, Bennet Omalu,
Concussions, and the NFL: How One Doctor Changed Football Forever, GQ MAG. (Sept. 15, 2009),
https://www.gq.com/story/nfl-players-brain-dementia-study-memory-concussions
[https://perma.cc/TQ2L-7VBR].
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prep football as well. By one estimate, high school football alone accounts for
between 43,200 and 67,200 U.S. concussions each year. 9 Between 2005 and 2014,
24 high school athletes died from head and neck injuries playing or practicing
football, according to the Centers for Disease Control. 10 Concerned parents and
policymakers are increasingly demanding data about concussions in high school
sports and insisting that schools improve safety measures to minimize serious
injuries. 11 The concern became so acute that the Obama administration convened a
White House summit in 2014 dedicated to addressing health risks in youth sports. 12
Over the past decade, legislatures in all 50 states and the District of Columbia have
enacted some form of legislation (commonly referred to as “return to play” laws)
addressing the treatment of scholastic athletes with concussion symptoms. 13
As president, George W. Bush brought national attention to the issue of
steroid abuse among youth athletes, a health risk that continues to plague prep sports
as players search for a competitive advantage. 14 Whether student-athletes can be
forced to submit to drug testing as a precondition to competing even made its way to
the U.S. Supreme Court, which in 1995 found the practice constitutional. 15 Prep
sports are a recurring matter of concern as high as the White House and Supreme
Court level, which demonstrates the public’s need for complete and accurate
information about the way youth sports are managed.

9. Lance K. Spaude, Time to Act: Correcting the Inadequacy of Youth Concussion Legislation
Through a Federal Act, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 1093, 1102 (2017).
10. Kristen L. Kucera et al., Traumatic Brain and Spinal Cord Fatalities Among High School and
College Football Players—United States, 2005–2014, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1465–
69 (2017).
11. A May 2014 study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association documented a
sharp rise in emergency-room visits for head injuries from 2006 to 2010, with 2.5 million people seeking
treatment in 2010, one-third of them children. Dina Fine Maron, A Generation Loses Consciousness, and
AM.
(May
13,
2014),
Grows
More
Conscious
of
Headbanging,
SCI.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-generation-loses-consciousness-and-grows-moreconscious-of-headbanging/ [https://perma.cc/26TL-BH67].
12. Dina Fine Maron, Obama to Host Sports Concussion Summit, SCI. AM. (May 28, 2014),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/obama-to-host-sports-concussion-summit/
[https://perma.cc/P6VL-EE99].
13. Chris Lau, Leaders and Laggards: Tackling State Legislative Responses to the Youth Sports
Concussion Epidemic, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2879 (2017); see also Lee Van Der Voo, How Max’s Injury
Became Max’s Law, INVESTIGATEWEST (May 23, 2018), https://www.invw.org/2018/05/23/how-maxsinjury-became-maxs-law/ [https://perma.cc/L8UX-4GZX]; Maggie FitzRoy, New Florida Law Protects
Young Athletes Recovering from Concussions, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Aug. 10, 2012, 3:18 PM),
https://www.jacksonville.com/community/shorelines/2012-08-10/story/new-florida-law-protects-youngathletes-recovering-concussions [https://perma.cc/55DD-VRRB].
14. The Associated Press, President: ‘Get Rid of Steroids Now,’ ESPN.COM (Jan. 21, 2004, 1:14
PM),
http://www.espn.com/gen/news/2004/0120/1714001.html
[https://perma.cc/BU7C-XCKS]
(reporting that President Bush used his State of the Union address to Congress to call on professional
sports leagues to set a better example for youth athletes by policing steroid use). The Partnership for DrugFree Kids reported that its 2013 survey of high school students found 11 percent had tried Human Growth
Hormone and 7 percent had tried anabolic steroids. Bob Cook, What Are We Supposed To Do About More
(July
30,
2014,
1:03
AM),
Teenagers
Taking
HGH?,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2014/07/30/what-are-we-supposed-to-do-about-more-teenagerstaking-hgh/#6f1a681c2f0c [https://perma.cc/6FNQ-WZRH].
15. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664–65 (1995).
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Aside from the health concerns surrounding high school athletics, the
economic impact is considerable. High school sports have been called “an economic
juggernaut,” with communities spending as much as $60 million on new facilities
and sponsors signing six-figure deals for the naming rights to stadiums. 16
Multimillion-dollar deals have also been made between broadcasting companies and
state high school athletic agencies for the rights to telecast the highest-interest
games. 17
School districts around the country allocate millions of dollars yearly to
fund their high school athletic departments. 18 For instance, in 2017, 36 high school
football head coaches made over $100,000 in Georgia, a state where football is
central to the high school experience. 19 By comparison, the average salary of a public
school teacher in Georgia that year was $55,532. 20 As author Amanda Ripley said in
a 2013 indictment of American schools’ obsession with sports: “In many schools,
sports are so entrenched that no one—not even the people in charge—realizes their
actual cost.” 21 It is manifestly the public’s business whether athletic competitions are
managed in a safe and financially responsible way.
High school athletic associations are the governing entities that oversee
high school athletics in every state. These agencies’ main responsibilities include,
but are not limited to: establishing game rules and regulations, determining students’
eligibility to play, organizing tournaments, hiring officials, negotiating broadcasting
arrangements, issuing awards of recognition, and imposing sanctions on athletes and

16. Mark Koba, High School Sports Have Turned Into Big Business, CNBC.COM (Dec. 9, 2012,
11:29 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/id/100001024 [https://perma.cc/6BQK-GXYR]; The Associated
Press, Texas High Schools Spending Tens of Millions on Football Stadiums, CBS NEWS (Apr. 29, 2016,
5:33
PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/texas-schools-spending-millions-on-football-stadiums/
[https://perma.cc/3U5A-J9MC].
17. Id.; see also Diane D’Amico, High School Sports Spending Grows as Budgets Get Tighter in New
Jersey, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, (Oct. 26, 2009), https://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/local/highschool-sports-spending-grows-as-budgets-get-tighter-%20in/article_91e4be4c-c182-11de-b076001cc4c03286.html [https://perma.cc/KF4H-D3RA] (stating that New Jersey public schools spend $200
million per year on athletics).
18. See The Case for High School Activities, NAT’L FED’N OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’NS,
http://www.nfhs.org/articles/the-case-for-high-school-activities/ [https://perma.cc/6W3M-6CDW].
19. Matthew Head, Georgia High School Football Coaches Score Big with $100k-Plus Salaries,
FIRST COAST NEWS, (Feb. 4, 2018, 7:18 PM), https://www.firstcoastnews.com/article/sports/highschool/football/georgia-high-school-football-coaches-score-big-with-100k-plus-salaries/77-514484550
[https://perma.cc/ML4F-BNQ3]. In another study, New Haven’s newspaper, the Register, looked at
athletic budgets for 30 Connecticut schools and found athletic directors earning as much as $129,000 a
year. See Chris Hunn, A Revealing Look into Area High School Athletic Budgets, NEW HAVEN REG. (June
15, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.nhregister.com/connecticut/article/A-revealing-look-into-area-highschool-athletic-11430036.php [https://perma.cc/CUZ5-ZHCC].
20. NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, RANKINGS OF THE STATES 2017 AND ESTIMATES OF SCHOOL STATISTICS
2018, at 26 (2018), http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/180413-Rankings_And_Estimates_Report_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GU4D-S6U].
21. Amanda Ripley, The Case Against High-School Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/the-case-against-high-school-sports/309447/
[https://perma.cc/S528-Z2A7].
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school athletic programs. 22 While they differ in scope, structure, and function, these
associations share a common feature: they are incorporated as nonprofit business
entities with a degree of legal separation from their member schools. That corporate
status has fostered uncertainty about whether HSAAs must obey state opengovernment laws as their member public schools do.
The unclear status of the state athletic associations is symptomatic of a
larger failure of state transparency laws to take account of the ways in which core
state functions are performed by nominally private quasi-governmental actors. State
laws do not always afford the public adequate opportunity to oversee the way
delegated state authority is being exercised by private designees. 23 Because they are
supported largely by public dollars, and because they exert authority over the way
school employees do their jobs and the way school programs are run, high school
sports governing bodies should be clearly made subject to open-government laws,
just as their member public schools already are.
This article examines the legal status of the nonprofit organizations that
make and enforce the rules governing high school sports competition. Researchers
from the Brechner Center surveyed all 51 of the statewide associations to ascertain
their willingness to comply with state open-records laws. The associations responded
with varying levels of cooperation (if they responded at all).
In Part II, the article explains how high school associations are structured
and how they resemble government agencies. Part III explains how the courts have
treated these quasi-public entities, both for purposes of state open-government laws
and, more generally, when their “state” status becomes significant to a claim brought
by an aggrieved party. Part IV describes the findings of the Center’s nationwide
open-records survey and how the associations’ responses—or lack of responses—
squares with the applicable open-government statutes. Finally, Part V concludes with
recommendations for clarifying state open-government laws to more explicitly apply
to associations comprised predominantly of public agencies, so that the public can
reliably obtain information about how important policy decisions are made.
II.

HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATIONS: HISTORY, STRUCTURE, AND
AUTHORITY

“We don’t have a large university that has thirty or forty thousand students
in it. We don’t have the art museum that some communities have and are worldrenowned. When somebody talks about West Texas, they talk about football.”
―H.G. Bissinger, Friday Night Lights: A Town, a Team, and a Dream
A.

The governance structure of high school sports

To understand the importance of public oversight of state athletic
associations, it is helpful to evaluate how these entities got into the business of

22. See Diane Heckman, Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Governing Interscholastic
Athletics, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 6–9 (2005) (describing scope of associations’ rulemaking
authority).
23. See generally Alexa Capeloto, Transparency on Trial: A Legal Review of Public Information
Access in the Face of Privatization, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 19 (2013).
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managing athletic competitions formerly run by state employees, and how much
influence these associations have over the lives of students.
State high school associations emerged around the turn of the 20th century,
in part as a means of promoting fair competition by enforcing standardized rules (for
instance, so that players would compete against those of comparable ages and
sizes). 24 Most date their existence to the early 1900s; the oldest, the Wisconsin
Interscholastic Athletic Association, was formed in 1895. 25 The most recent addition,
the D.C. State Athletic Association, was founded in 2012. 26 To varying degrees,
these associations function as extensions of state and local governments or in concert
with them; a 2001 survey of 46 associations found that 14 operated under the
authority of their state legislatures, and 27 had one or more designated seats on their
governing boards for the state education commissioner and/or that person’s
appointee(s). 27
Strictly speaking, state associations operate only postseason competitions
and not regular-season games. But their authority extends to eligibility for all
sporting events, not just the championship round. For instance, state associations
commonly enforce age limits and residency limits that restrict participation even in
regular-season competition. 28 They also restrict how much football teams can
practice and under what weather conditions. 29 In this way, high school athletic
associations exercise supervisory authority over their member schools and even over
individual students. Other rules and standards commonly enforced by state
associations include minimum academic performance, dress and grooming, use of
illegal or performance-enhancing drugs, amateur status and acceptance of

24. See Stephen S. Goodman IV, The University Interscholastic League of Texas: Who Are These
Guys and What Can They Do?, 16 ST. MARY’S L.J. 979, 983–84 (1985) (explaining founding purposes
of Texas athletic association); see also Robinson v. Kansas State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 917 P.2d
836, 840, 842 (Kan. 1996) (tracing history and purpose of Kansas’ association, including extent of
ongoing oversight by Kansas’ legislature and State Board of Education); ARIZ. INTERSCHOLASTIC ASS’N,
THE HISTORY, RATIONALE AND APPLICATION OF THE ESSENTIAL ELIGIBILITY RULES OF THE ARIZONA
INTERSCHOLASTIC ASSOCIATION (2014), http://aiaonline.org/files/3010/the-history-rationale-andapplication-of-the-essential-eligibility-rules-of-the-arizona-interscholastic-association.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QB2V-66PM].
25. What is the WIAA? Why Was It Established?, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N,
https://www.wiaawi.org/aboutwiaa.aspx [https://perma.cc/YJC4-SH4A].
26. About DCSAA, D.C. ST. ATHLETIC ASS’N, https://www.dcsaasports.org/page/show/3453123about-dcsaa [https://perma.cc/V499-ZUEF].
27. Alan R. Madry, Statewide School Athletic Associations and Constitutional Liability; Brentwood
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 365, 394
(2001).
28. See, e.g., Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995)
(challenge to high school athletic association’s maximum-age limit for boys’ sports); Pottgen v. Mo. State
High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); Okla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Bray,
321 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1963) (challenge to rule restricting athletic participation by student who moves
to school different from school of family’s residency); Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc. v. Carlberg ex
rel. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. 1997) (same).
29. See Sam C. Ehrlich, Gratuitous Promises: Overseeing Athletic Organizations and the Duty to
Care, 25 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 1, 10–11 (2018) (explaining breadth of state associations’
regulatory authority over practice conditions).
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compensation, and other threshold eligibility standards to compete in interscholastic
sports. 30
The National Federation of State High School Associations (“NFHS”) was
founded in 1920, with the initial goal of setting more uniform standards and
organization of high school sports. 31 Over the years, as new state associations
formed, the NFHS would absorb them as members, so that today, the Federation
encompasses every state’s athletic association. 32 Correspondingly, NFHS has
continually expanded its functions. Although its initial role was to facilitate
competition between schools and codify rules, it is now involved in almost
everything relating to high school extracurriculars and athletics. For instance, the
federation conducts research projects, provides training courses, and digitally
broadcasts games. 33 Policies promulgated by the national association, such as
protocols for preventing concussions, trickle down to the state level and become
binding on public schools and their employees by way of state HSAA regulation. 34
NFHS’ governance structure is driven by the voting members, which are
the 51 state member associations. 35 Each member delegates one representative to
serve on the National Council, the rulemaking body of the organization. The National
Council elect the Board of Directors, comprised of 12 members, which has
management authority over the organization. Eight directors represent a
corresponding geographical section of the country and four directors hold “at-large”
seats. An eight-member Appeal Board, appointed by the National Council, serves a
quasi-judicial role reviewing disputes over the Board’s determinations of member
violations. The Federation operates under a constitution and set of Bylaws.
While each state association maintains their own unique governance
structure, they all essentially follow the same three-branch governance model as the
NFHS. For each state agency, there is a corresponding board of directors (sometimes
referred to as the executive committee). While HSAA boards are almost always made
up of administrators from member school districts—superintendents, principals,
athletic directors—daily operations are run by a full-time “commissioner” or
“president.” Many associations also have a legislative body comprised of principals
and/or athletic directors who vote on revisions to the rules of competition. Some
associations also maintain a quasi-judicial appeal board that can review sanctions or
disqualifications imposed on schools, coaches, or individual athletes. Demonstrating
that they are creatures of their constituent schools, HSAA bylaws and constitutions
30. See Heckman, supra note 22, at 6–9 (describing scope of associations’ rulemaking authority).
31. See About Us, NAT’L FED’N OF ST. HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, https://www.nfhs.org/who-weare/aboutus [https://perma.cc/R2JA-BA5U].
32. State ex rel. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass’n v. Schoenlaub, 507 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Mo.
1974) (en banc).
33. See NAT’L FED’N OF ST. HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, supra note 31.
34. See Ehrlich, supra note 29, at 10–11 (asserting that “dozens” of states have enacted rules to reduce
the risk of concussions in accordance with NFHS recommendations ); see also Smith v. Runnels Schools,
Inc., 2004-1329, p. 111 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05); 907 So. 2d 109 (“The National Federation of State High
School Associations . . . drafts the rules that govern the play of high school basketball.”).
FED’N
OF
STATE
HIGH
SCH.
ASS’NS
5–6,
35. NAT’L
https://www.nfhs.org/media/885655/nfhs_company_brochure.pdf
[https://perma.cc/THP9-A5EL]
(includes information about the workings and structure of the National Federation of State High School
Associations).
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commonly provide that, in the event of dissolution, their assets will be distributed
back to their member schools. 36
Structurally, some state associations are more clearly “governmental” than
others. Perhaps the clearest case for governmental status is in Texas. The University
Interscholastic League (“UIL”) is housed within the University of Texas, where its
staff members are salaried employees of a state university and League rule changes
must be reviewed by the State Board of Education. 37 Yet even with the great weight
of factual evidence that the League operates as an integral part of Texas state
government, courts have still reached diverging conclusions as to whether it is a
private club or a public agency. 38
HSAAs are structured as membership organizations comprised of member
schools, often with a membership dues structure. Because most members of these
associations are public schools, considerable public money flows through them,
either directly (in the form of membership dues and entry fees for tournaments) or
indirectly (in the form of free or subsidized use of school facilities and personnel).
While some associations control the conduct of other extracurricular activities such
as music or debate, most of the 51 associations deal exclusively with the
administration and oversight of athletics.
Although membership is not generally made legally mandatory, it is
debatable how “voluntary” membership really is, since non-members lose the ability
to compete in postseason tournaments and may not be able to play regular-season
interscholastic games against member schools. 39 Member schools may need their
state association’s permission to play or even practice against a nonmember school. 40
As a practical reality, schools concerned with offering a meaningful opportunity to
compete in athletics at a high level find that they have no choice but to join. 41
B.

Small athletes, big bucks: Sponsorships and broadcast rights

High school athletic competitions are increasingly becoming a mass
spectator event in the model of college sports. States have even begun issuing Rating

36. See, e.g., ARIZ. INTERSCHOLASTIC ASS’N, 2019-2020 CONSTITUTION, BYLAWS, POLICIES AND
2,
http://aiaonline.org/files/14046/2018-2019-aia-constitution-bylaws-policies-andprocedures-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AX4-FY2N] (“In the event of dissolution of this corporations, all
assets remaining after payments of all debts and liabilities shall be distributed to the member schools.”).
37. Goodman, supra note 24, at 992–93, 995 n.121, 1001.
38. See Goodman, supra note 24, at 988–93 (stating that the UIL’s legal status is “ambiguous” and
collecting cases reaching differing outcomes).
39. See Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass’n v. Thomas, 409 So. 2d 245, 246–47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982),
rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass’n v. Thomas ex rel. Thomas, 434
So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1983) (finding that membership in Florida state association “is, in effect, mandatory”
because membership is a prerequisite to competing in interscholastic activities).
40. See Ashley J. Becnel, Note, Friday Night Lights Reach the Supreme Court: How a Case About
High School Football Changed the First Amendment, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 327, 328 (2008) (explaining this
approval mechanism in Texas).
41. See Michelle Newman, Note, Foul Territory: Identifying Media Restrictions in High School
Athletics Outside the Bounds of First Amendment Values, 14 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 59, 70 (2012)
(“‘[V]oluntary’ is not the most accurate word to define sports association membership. In each state, there
are very limited, or in most instance, no alternatives to membership in the single sports association.”).
PROCEDURES
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Percentage Indexes, or RPI, that rank the strength of high school teams, 42 and
colleges’ recruiting and signing of highly rated high school prospects is a matter of
intense fascination across talk radio and the blogosphere. 43 The “professionalization”
of high school sports means more corporate money flowing into athletic programs,
with some programs signing seven-figure deals to promote local or national brands. 44
These sponsorship deals have, at times, raised ethical concerns, especially where
coaches benefit from deals they help negotiate. 45 During the 2010 season, researchers
visited 24 high school basketball games across Indiana and found an average of
nearly 44 visible corporate sponsorship appearances per event, with Coca-Cola,
Pepsi, and McDonald’s being the most-represented brands. 46
As the popularity of high school sports has increased, 47 broadcast rights for
postseason sports, especially football, have become a valuable and sought-after
commodity. The NFHS and its commercial partner, PlayOn! Sports, televise some
40,000 prep sporting events, which one broadcast executive termed “the final
frontier” now that the viewing public is saturated with coverage of college games. 48

42. David Pierce & Jeffrey Petersen, Corporate Sponsorship Activation Analysis in Interscholastic
Athletics, 4 J. OF SPONSORSHIP 272, 278 (2011).
43. See Becnel, supra note 40, at 331 (noting that nationwide media attention paid to recruiting of
high-schoolers has raised the stakes for authorities that regulate recruiting practices); see also Special to
the Oregonian, 1080 The Fan, Andrew Nemec Announce Weekly Recruiting Radio Show,
OREGONLIVE.COM
(Jan.
9,
2019),
https://www.oregonlive.com/recruiting/index.ssf/2017/08/1080_the_fan_andrew_nemec_anno.html
[https://perma.cc/PB7P-VN6E] (announcing debut of weekly radio program dedicated to Oregon athletic
recruiting); Bob Cook, NCAA Research Shows Pervasiveness of Early Recruiting—Especially of Female
Athletes, FORBES, (Dec. 29, 2017 3:17 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2017/12/29/ncaaresearch-shows-pervasiveness-of-early-recruiting-especially-of-female-athletes/ [https://perma.cc/E9TTHLGC] (noting that an NCAA survey published in 2017 showed that students increasingly are reporting
contact by college recruiters as early as their freshman year in high school, if not before).
44. See, e.g., Carol Thompson, Under $1.5 Million Proposed Deal, LVHN Logo Would Appear on
East Penn’s Football Field, Gyms and More, MORNING CALL (May 23, 2018, 8:35 AM),
https://www.mcall.com/news/education/mc-nws-lvhn-east-penn-sponsorship-20180515-story.html
[https://perma.cc/7LTP-DTQ3] (reporting on healthcare conglomerate’s 10-year sponsorship arrangement
to put company name on stadiums, gyms and tickets at Pennsylvania school district); Bob Cook, School
District Tries to Scare Up $3 Million in Advertising to Pay for Sports, FORBES (Aug. 30, 2012, 5:19 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2012/08/30/school-tries-to-scare-up-3-million-in-advertising-topay-for-sports/ [https://perma.cc/5RLG-44Y8] (“For years, schools have gotten more aggressive and
ambitious about selling off space to corporate sponsors to make up for money they can’t get—or would
rather not try to get—from taxpayers, including offering naming rights to facilities.”).
45. See, e.g., Amy Donaldson, High School Sponsorship Contracts Raise Concerns, but Also Benefit
NEWS
(March
5,
2013,
9:30
PM),
Programs,
DESERET
https://www.deseret.com/2013/3/5/20515622/high-school-sponsorship-contracts-raise-concerns-butalso-benefit-programs [https://perma.cc/F99T-YKSK] (noting that Utah state auditors raised concerns
about compliance with bidding and conflict-of-interest laws in coaches’ deals with apparel companies).
46. See Pierce & Petersen, supra note 42, at 278.
47. See Becnel, supra note 40, at 332 (observing that nearly 1 million ESPN viewers watched a
football game between two Florida high school teams in 2005, and cable channel MTV based an entire
“reality” show on an especially successful Alabama high school football program).
48. Brandon Costa, ‘Stepping Over Dead Bodies’: Has the NFHS Network Figured Out Live High
School Sports Production?, SPORTS VIDEO GROUP NEWS, (Nov. 25, 2014, 1:55 PM),
https://www.sportsvideo.org/2014/11/25/stepping-over-dead-bodies-has-the-nfhs-network-figured-outlive-high-school-sports-production/ [https://perma.cc/DPU9-W5Q9].
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PlayOn!, regarded as the largest and most influential company specializing in
producing prep sports events, reporting revenue of $10 million in 2013, an annual
revenue growth rate of 80 percent, and it deals with 600 schools in 32 states, with a
per-school annual fee of $2,000 to $3,000 for the company to produce telecasts of
games. 49 In addition to the fees from schools, rights-holders profit from pay-perview fees, which run around $10 for a single game or $120 for a yearly viewing
pass. 50
As state associations have locked up broadcast rights in exclusive long-term
contracts, journalists have seen their access diminish. 51 Local television outlets have
been limited in how much footage they can air and archive on their websites, and
journalists have been placed under restrictive credentialing conditions, at times
leading to litigation. 52
In 2009, the Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletics Association (“WIAA”)
sued the owners of the Appleton, Wisconsin newspaper seeking a declaratory
judgment upholding the association’s exclusive contract for video coverage of
postseason sports, which the newspaper defied by posting video of four high school
football games to its website. 53 Under a 10-year agreement, WIAA gave a private
vendor, American Hi-Fi, Inc., exclusive rights to all video depictions of postseason
tournaments (live broadcasting, online streaming, video-on-demand) in exchange for
a share of revenues. 54 Media outlets could purchase video highlight clips from
American Hi-Fi, but were limited to posting no more than two minutes of game
action on their sites, a limit that the newspaper’s owners, Gannett Co., deemed
unacceptable. 55
Gannett, joined by the Wisconsin Newspaper Association, argued that a
government actor cannot enter into a contract that restrains the ability of news
organizations to stream images of newsworthy events. But the federal Seventh
Circuit found no constitutional violation. 56 What Gannett sought to do—stream and

49. Bill Hendricks, Media Company Scores by Broadcasting Prep Games, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (June
1,
2013),
https://www.ajc.com/business/media-company-scores-broadcasting-prepgames/thnYfqFaItki1we8u2GuHI/ [https://perma.cc/V98K-ZQUF] (interviewing company’s chief
executive officer, who characterizes PlayOn! as “the largest rights holder, producer and aggregator of
high school sporting events”).
50. See Michael Lycklama, IHSAA Ends Webcasting Contract with IdahoSports.com, IDAHO
STATESMAN:
VARSITY
EXTRA
BLOG
(Apr.
16,
2016,
9:51
AM),
https://www.idahostatesman.com/sports/high-school/varsity-extra-blog/article70272697.html
[https://perma.cc/LT5M-H9QB] (setting out fees for subscriber packages from NFHS Network, a joint
venture of the National Federation of State High School Associations and PlayOn! Sports).
51. See Samantha Vicent, Exclusivity Contracts Limit Student Journalists’ Live Sports Coverage,
STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Feb. 1, 2014), https://splc.org/2014/02/exclusivity-contracts-limit-studentjournalists-live-sports-coverage/ [https://perma.cc/QYR5-99DQ] (describing how high school journalists
in California and Colorado have been denied opportunities to cover their own schools’ games because of
exclusionary contracts with broadcasters).
52. Alicia Wagner Calzada, Shut Out: The Dispute over Media Access Rights in High School and
College Sports, 7 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1–4 (2010).
53. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co., 716 F. Supp. 2d 773 (W.D. Wis. 2010), aff’d
on other grounds, 658 F.3d 614 (7th Cir. 2011).
54. Id. at 777–78.
55. Id. at 780.
56. Wis. Interscholastic, 658 F.3d at 629.
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archive video of games start-to-finish on its newspapers’ websites—did not
constitute protected news coverage, the court held, but rather was the unprotected
appropriation of a valuable entertainment product:
An exclusive contract for transmission of an event is not a gag
order or ‘prior restraint’ on speech about government activities.
The media are free under the policy to talk and write about the
events to their hearts’ content. What they cannot do is to
appropriate the entertainment product that WIAA has created
without paying for it. 57
The court afforded special deference to the WIAA’s authority because, in the judges’
view, the telecast of a high school football game was a case of government
employing private contractors to transmit the government’s own speech. 58 Because
the WIAA was acting in a “proprietary” role as the purveyor of speech, the court
reviewed its actions merely for reasonableness. 59
A similar dispute arose in Illinois in 2008, when the Illinois High School
Association denied media credentials to news organizations that were found to have
sold reprints of game photos contrary to an IHSA rights agreement giving a private
vendor, Visual Image Photography, Inc., exclusive resale rights to game-action
images. 60 News organizations sued to challenge the restrictions, but in the face of
state legislative proposals to assure journalists the right to sell their game
photographs, the IHSA settled the case. 61
The dispute reemerged, though, in 2012. The same news organizations
again challenged the IHSA’s authority to assess fees for airing news webcasts
including game footage shot at postseason sporting events. But an Illinois trial court
found no breach of the 2008 settlement, which covered only still photography and
not online streaming. 62
As these legal conflicts illustrate, there is significant public interest in
access to high school sporting events, and that interest translates into great
commercial value. When public entities enter into exclusive long-term contracts for
57. Id. at 621–22. There was no dispute that the First Amendment applied to the WIAA, because both
parties stipulated that WIAA qualified as a state actor. Id. at 616.
58. Id. at 623.
59. See id. at 626. This analysis is fundamentally flawed. A football game is not “speech.” The
telecast of the game is speech. And the telecast of the game was the speech of the broadcaster (in this
case, American Hi-Fi), so there was no “government message” in the case. The WIAA’s restriction on
Gannett’s use of game footage is properly analyzed as a regulatory act and not, as the Seventh Circuit
characterized it, a “proprietary” one. As a regulatory act, the exclusivity rules should have been scrutinized
for content-neutrality and, if found to be content-based, subjected to strict scrutiny. See City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986) (stating that content-based restrictions on speech are
presumptively unconstitutional).
60. Corinna Zarek, Sidelined?, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,
https://www.rcfp.org/journals/the-news-media-and-the-law-winter-2008/sidelined/
[https://perma.cc/9LB2-DU96].
61. Frank LoMonte, Access to Student Athletic Events, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Apr. 1, 2008),
http://www.splc.org/article/2008/04/access-to-student-athletic-events [https://perma.cc/SX4A-72QP].
62. Samantha Raphelson, Illinois Schools Association Can Charge Newspapers Who Broadcast
Sports Events, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.splc.org/article/2012/11/illinoisschools-association-can-charge-newspapers-who-broadcast-sports-events [https://perma.cc/JE87-FA44].
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the use of valuable public assets, the need for oversight and transparency is readily
apparent.
III.
A.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF SPORTS ASSOCIATIONS

Sports associations as “state actors”

When a student is wrongfully denied an educational opportunity by a public
school, the student has recourse under the U.S. Constitution. 63 The Constitution
guarantees all citizens the right to freedom of expression and association, the right
to receive due process before a government benefit is taken away, and the right to
receive equal protection of laws that implicate fundamental rights. But where the
wrong is attributable to a private corporation, an injured party normally has no
recourse under the Constitution.
“State action” is a prerequisite to maintaining a constitutional claim. 64
Because the Constitution acts as a check only on governmental authority, a plaintiff
alleging a constitutional injury must establish that the defendant acted “under color
of” state law. 65 A private corporation normally is not regarded as a state actor
responsible for adhering to the Constitution. 66 But at times, the courts have found
“state action” where a private entity acts in place of, at the behest of, or in close
collaboration with a government agency, particularly where the function being
performed is governmental in nature. 67
High school associations commonly face constitutional challenges alleging
denial of equal protection or due process. Transfer rules that restrict players from
hopping from team to team have been challenged as interfering with familial privacy
and with the fundamental right to travel. 68 Regulations that forbid girls from playing
on boys’ teams, and vice-versa, have been attacked as impermissible gender-based
discrimination. 69 Whether an athletic association engages in “state action” when
63. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (recognizing that because states require students to
attend school, there is a property interest in the receipt of a public education that cannot be taken away
without process).
64. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1974).
65. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978).
66. See id. at 156.
67. See Joseph P. Trevino, The WIAA as a State Actor: A Decade Later, Brentwood Academy’s
Potential Effect on Wisconsin Interscholastic Sports, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 287, 291 (2011)
(observing that “there is not a bright-line, all-encompassing test for finding state action” and that, over
time, the Supreme Court’s view of what constitutes state action by a private entity “has undergone
relatively dramatic changes”).
68. See, e.g., Zander v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass’n (In re United States), 682 F.2d 147 (8th
Cir. 1982) (dismissing challenge to Missouri HSAA rule requiring students who switch schools to forfeit
a year of playing eligibility, which student plaintiffs challenged as unduly burdening their constitutionally
guaranteed right to travel and right of free association); Niles v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 715 F.2d
1027 (5th Cir. 1983) (summarily rejecting student’s claim that Texas HSAA restrictions on eligibility for
transfer students, meant to prevent “hopping” between athletic programs, infringed the student’s right to
travel or right of familial privacy).
69. See, e.g., Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting
constitutional challenge to Arizona HSAA rule that forbade boys from playing on girls’ teams); Attorney
Gen. v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 393 N.E.2d 284 (Mass. 1979) (striking down HSAA
prohibition against boys playing on girls’ sports teams on equal protection grounds).
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regulating interscholastic athletics has been a decisive question in dozens of legal
disputes involving students’ eligibility to play. The general consensus, with a few
exceptions, is “yes.”
Finding that an athletic association is a state actor for constitutional
purposes does not automatically mean it will also be a public body for purposes of
open-government statutes. 70 But the two inquiries have substantial overlap; in each
instance, courts will look at whether the function being performed is of
“governmental” character, and whether the private entity is acting under state
supervision or exercising state-delegated power. 71 Because there are far more
reported cases about high school associations’ governmental status in the
constitutional context than in the open-government context, the “state action” body
of caselaw is instructive by analogy.
1.

Early caselaw

In a much-disputed 2001 ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a high
school athletic association governed by a board entirely made up of publics school
administrators and with a membership comprised 84 percent of public schools was a
“state actor” susceptible to First Amendment and due process claims. 72 Leading up
to that ruling, lower courts had struggled for decades with the legal status of these
neither-fish-nor-fowl entities. 73
The earliest caselaw treated athletic associations as private clubs, virtually
immune to judicial intervention in their enactment and enforcement of rules. 74 But
as pressure mounted for long-segregated schools to afford minority students the full
benefits of public education, the judiciary began getting more involved in overseeing
the affairs of high school associations.
In one 1968 case, an all-black Catholic high school in New Orleans
challenged the Louisiana High School Athletic Association’s refusal to grant the
school membership without explanation; at the time, the association had only
recently begun to accept integrated public schools as members. 75 The district court

70. See Goodman, supra note 24, at 1002 (“Classification of the League’s activities as ‘state action’
is a distinct legal question from the League’s status as a state agency or private association.”).
71. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Schiffbauer v. Banaszak, 2015 Ohio St. 3d 1854, 2015-Ohio-1854, 33
N.E.3d 52 (finding that a private university’s police department was a “public office” subject to Ohio’s
open-records act, which extends coverage to “any state agency, public institution, political subdivision,
or other organized body, office, agency, institution, or entity established by the laws of this state for the
exercise of any function of government.” (citing OHIO REV. CODE § 149.011(A))) (emphasis supplied).
72. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
73. See, e.g., Quimby v. Sch. Dist. No. 21, 455 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Ariz. 1969) (rejecting argument that
rules of high school association were unreviewable because it is a voluntary membership organization,
and observing that largest portion of association’s budget came from dues paid by public schools, and that
its rules affected students’ ability to take part in public school activities); Crandall v. N.D. High Sch.
Activities Ass’n, 261 N.W.2d 921, 925 (N.D. 1978) (citing Quimby case and finding that rules of North
Dakota association are subject to judicial review “because the Association is primarily supported by public
funds and is performing a quasi-governmental function”).
74. See John C. Weistart, Rule-Making in Interscholastic Sports: The Bases of Judicial Review, 11 J.
L. & EDUC. 291, 335 (1982) (noting judges’ gradually increasing willingness to scrutinize HSAA
decisions in context of discrimination complaints).
75. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. St. Augustine High Sch., 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968).

100

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 50; No. 1

held, and the federal Fifth Circuit agreed, that Louisiana’s high school athletic
association engages in state action, and found the exercise of state authority for the
purpose of maintaining segregation to be unlawful. 76 The appeals court was
persuaded both by the structure and operations of the LHSAA—its staff members
were classified as “teachers” eligible for state retirement benefits, and most of the
association’s money came from ticket sales for events held in state facilities—and
also by the power that the association wielded to compel schools and administrators
to conform to association rules:
The power of the Association reaches not only to the stadiums, the
gymnasiums and the locker rooms but into the public classrooms,
the public principals’ offices and the public pocketbook. It
exercises control over curricula—a coach must teach a designated
minimum number of classes per week. Principals are required to
submit certain reports to the Association. The Association has the
power to investigate, discipline and punish member schools by
fine and otherwise. If a public school principal does not comply
with the mandate of the Association, or if a public school coach
uses an athlete whose eligibility is questioned by the Association,
or if the student body of a public school act improperly in
connection with an athletic event, the school—a state agency—is
subject to Association discipline. 77
The Fifth Circuit’s view in the Louisiana case became the near-unanimous
view everywhere. 78 Courts have concluded that high school associations engage in
state action in Florida, 79 Illinois, 80 Indiana, 81 Kentucky, 82 Massachusetts, 83
Missouri, 84 New Hampshire, 85 Oklahoma, 86 Pennsylvania, 87 Rhode Island, 88 and
Tennessee. 89 The conclusion that HSAAs engage in state action is often based on the
finding that they perform duties that would otherwise have been performed by public
schools or districts; for instance, the Sixth Circuit found that the Kentucky
association “apparently funded in part through dues paid by the state’s public
schools, performs the [school board’s] statutory functions with respect to
interscholastic athletics.” 90 Other rulings emphasize the entwinement of functions

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
1982).
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 228.
Id. at 227.
See Heckman, supra note 22, at 10; supra notes 37, 38 (collecting cases).
Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass’n, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 369 So. 2d 398, 402 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
Griffin High Sch. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 822 F.2d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 1987).
Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc. v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Ind. 1997).
See Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994).
Davis v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 3 Mass. L. Rptr. 375 (Mass. 1995).
Zander v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass’n (In re United States), 682 F.2d 147, 151 (8th Cir.
Duffley v. N.H. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 446 A.2d 462, 466 (N.H. 1982).
Okla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Bray, 321 F.2d 269, 273 (10th Cir. 1963).
Pennsylvania v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 334 A.2d 839, 842 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, Inc., 612 A.2d 734, 736 (R.I. 1992).
Kelley v. Metro. Cty. Bd. Of Ed., 293 F. Supp. 485, 491 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265, 272 (6th Cir. 1994).
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between the state associations and their member public schools, as a federal court
did in applying the state-action doctrine to Indiana’s HSAA: “The IHSAA is an
organization whose very existence is entirely dependent upon the absolute
cooperation and support of the public school system of the State of Indiana. . . . “ 91
A few outliers, however, declined to treat the associations’ oversight of high
school sports as state action. In a 1989 ruling, the federal Sixth Circuit found that the
Ohio High School Athletic Association (“OHSAA”) did not act under color of state
law in establishing and enforcing eligibility requirements for participation in
competitive soccer. 92 The court found the OSHAA legally indistinguishable from the
NCAA, which the circuit had previously determined to be a purely private actor
immune from constitutional claims. 93 The OHSAA did not meet either of the
circuit’s recognized tests for classification as a state actor: it did not perform a
function exclusively reserved for the state, and the state did not cause or control its
decisions. 94
While lopsided, the division of circuit-level authority about the status of
high school associations teed up the issue for Supreme Court resolution.
2.

Brentwood Academy: The Supreme Court finds state action

In 1997, the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (“TSSAA”)
imposed a $3,000 fine and two-year ban from postseason competition on Brentwood
Academy, a Christian prep school in Nashville, after finding that Brentwood’s
football coach violated association regulations in recruiting middle-school athletes. 95
Brentwood sued the association to enjoin enforcement of the recruiting rule, alleging
(among other claims) violations of the school’s First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. 96
Before reaching the substance of the claims, the federal district court
thoroughly analyzed the legal status of high school sports associations and concluded
that the TSSAA engages in state action, finding “overwhelming evidence of the
symbiotic relationship between TSSAA and the public, state-controlled school
system.” 97 While federal district courts in Tennessee had previously found the
association to be a state actor, 98 the TSSAA argued that those cases no longer
applied, because the state Board of Education (in reaction to the previous rulings)
revised its rules to remove references to “delegating” governmental authority to the
association. 99 But the judge looked beyond this cosmetic revision to the substance of
the relationship, and found it unaltered: “[T]he connections between TSSAA and the

91. Robbins v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 941 F. Supp. 786, 791 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
92. Burrows v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 891 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1989).
93. Id. at 125 (citing Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953, 957 (6th Cir. 1986)).
94. Id.
95. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 13 F. Supp. 2d 670, 67577 (M.D.
Tenn. 1998), rev’d, 180 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 1999).
96. Id. at 672.
97. Id. at 683.
98. Graham v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:95-cv-044, 1995 WL 115890, at *4 (E.D.
Tenn. Feb. 20, 1995); Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 735 F. Supp. 753, 759 (M.D.
Tenn.1990); Kelley v. Metro. Cty. Bd. of Educ., 293 F. Supp. 485, 491 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
99. Brentwood, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 680.
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State are still pervasive and entwined. Nothing about the function of TSSAA has
changed. Nothing about the realities of control over secondary school athletics has
materially changed.” 100
The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding no state action. 101 The appeals court
applied the Supreme Court’s 1980s “Blum Trilogy,” 102 in which the justices offered
a series of analytical tests by which a non-governmental entity might be found to
engage in state action. 103 The appeals court found none of those tests to be satisfied;
because there is no constitutional entitlement to play sports, the operation of
tournaments is not a “public function,” and the state did not “compel” or “coerce”
the association to do its bidding. 104 The appellate court was more persuaded by the
state school board’s seemingly symbolic gesture of rewording its rules to remove
references to “delegation,” regarding the removal as evidencing the state’s intent to
revoke its grant of authority. 105 The court was unconvinced by Sixth Circuit
precedent holding state athletic associations responsible for adhering to Title IX, 106
finding that even a nonstate private entity could be liable so long as it accepted any
federal funding, which would not necessarily qualify the recipient as a “state actor”
for constitutional purposes. 107
Brentwood Academy asked the Supreme Court to take the case. 108 The
academy pointed to the seemingly overwhelming consensus of other circuits that the
regulation of high school athletics qualifies as state action. 109 But the TSSAA waved

100. Id. at 681.
101. Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 766.
102. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982);
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
103. Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 763–64.
104. Id. at 763–64.
105. Id. at 766.
106. Id. at 765 (citing Yellow Springs v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 647 F.2d 651, 653 (6th
Cir.1981)).
107. Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 765.
108. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531
U.S. 288 (2001) (No. 99-901).
109. Id. at 7–8, 8 n.3. The petitioners cited five circuit-level decisions categorizing high school
associations as state actors, including: Louisiana High School Athletic Ass’n v. St. Augustine High
School, 396 F.2d 224, 227–28 (5th Cir. 1968) (“There can be no substantial doubt that conduct of the
affairs of LHSAA is state action” and the nominally private status of LHSAA “cannot obscure the real
and pervasive involvement of the state in the total program”); Griffin High School v. Illinois High Sch.
Ass’n, 822 F.2d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 1987) (observing that Illinois association had an “overwhelmingly
public character” because its members are predominantly public institutions); Zander v. Missouri State
High School Activities Ass’n (In re United States), 682 F.2d 147, 151 (8th Cir. 1982) (stating that
MSHSAA rules were state action because the association’s membership is overwhelmingly public
schools); Brenden v. Independent School District, 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1295 (8th Cir. 1973) (finding that
integral involvement of public school districts in HSAA policymaking rendered the organization a state
actor); Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that Arizona
HSAA engages in state action because the “member public schools play a substantial role in determining
and enforcing the policies and regulations of the AIA” and because the association’s “rulemaking
procedure integrally involve the member schools and school districts in the decision making process”).
Id. at 8 n.3. The petition also cited a Third Circuit case, Moreland v. Western Pa. Interscholastic Athletic
League, 572 F.2d 121, 125 (3d Cir 1978), recognizing the parties’ concession that state action was present.
Id.
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off those cases as either containing minimal analysis or as unpersuasive because they
were decided under outdated legal standards predating the Supreme Court’s series of
1981-82 Blum rulings.
The justices accepted certiorari and reversed the Sixth Circuit, finding that
the TSSAA engaged in state action in its oversight of interscholastic sports. 110
To reach its result, the Court had to circumnavigate its own 1988 ruling in
National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian 111 that the NCAA did not engage in
state action in sanctioning the University of Nevada-Las Vegas (“UNLV”) basketball
program for ethical violations. In the Tarkanian case, UNLV’s head basketball coach
argued that the NCAA qualified as a state actor, either because the university
delegated governmental authority to the organization or because the two acted in
concert. 112 The justices rejected both arguments.
In a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court found that
the NCAA acted neither as an extension of, nor in conjunction with, the university.
Stevens framed the enforcement proceeding as an adversarial one, in which the
NCAA acted as representative of its members other than UNLV (private and public)
in recommending sanctions; UNLV, he wrote, could have ignored the
recommendations but chose not to, so the decision afflicting Tarkanian was
ultimately made by the university. 113 Justice Byron White, a former college football
star, authored the four-justice dissent. White wrote the NCAA “acted jointly with
UNLV” in deciding to suspend Tarkanian. 114 Tarkanian’s suspension resulted from
UNLV’s agreement to subject itself to NCAA regulations, including the obligation
as an NCAA member to defer to the NCAA’s factual findings when the institution
is investigated; consequently, the NCAA acted in concert with UNLV in bringing
about the suspension. 115
The Brentwood Court found a single state’s high school sports association
to be decisively different in structure from the NCAA, which by its national scale
cannot be said to operate at the behest of any particular state. 116 (Indeed, the
Tarkanian opinion overtly suggested that the analysis might come out differently for
a single state’s scholastic sports association. 117) Justice David Souter, writing for a
5-4 majority in Brentwood, characterized the TSSAA as “an organization of public
schools represented by their officials acting in their official capacity to provide an

110. Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. 288, 305 (2001).
111. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
112. Id. at 191–92.
113. Id. at 196.
114. Id. at 200 (White, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 201–02.
116. Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 298 (2001).
117. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193 n.13 (“The situation would, of course, be different if the membership
consisted entirely of institutions located within the same State, many of them public institutions created
by the same sovereign.”). Some commentators have found the Brentwood Court’s distinction unpersuasive
and likely to invite confusing line-drawing problems. See, e.g., Aaron Echols, Fair Play: The Tension
Between an Athletic Association’s Regulator Power and Free Speech Rights of Member Schools, 28 J.
NAT’L ASS’N OF ADMIN. L. JUD’Y 237, 273 (2008) (“At some point, the judicial system is going to be
forced to further delineate exactly what causes an athletic association such as TSSAA to be a state actor
when an organization like the NCAA has continually been seen as a private organization.”).
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integral element of secondary public schooling.” 118 For the majority, the
“entwinement” between the association, the state of Tennessee, and the public school
system was decisive: members of the state Board of Education served ex-officio roles
with the association by virtue of their state office, TSSAA employees were entitled
to state fringe benefits, and the state deemed participation in association-sponsored
events to satisfy the state’s physical education requirement. 119
The association argued that the result should be dictated by the Court’s 1982
ruling in Rendell-Baker that a private high school was not performing a sufficiently
“public” function to be liable for a constitutional claim. 120 While conceding that the
TSSAA might fall short of the threshold for state action staked out in Rendell-Baker
(“an exclusively and traditionally public” function), the Souter majority regarded
Rendell-Baker as merely one of several alternative ways in which a private
organization might qualify as a state actor. 121
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the four-justice dissent, finding that the
Tennessee association did not perform a sufficiently governmental function to be
regarded as a state actor under Blum. 122 Thomas enumerated all of the ways in which
the TSSAA resembled a private enterprise—state law does not make membership
mandatory, membership is open to private as well as public entities, private-school
administrators are eligible to sit on the board, the bulk of its revenues come from
ticket sales and not governmental appropriations—and concluded that the
association’s actions are not “attributable to the State.” 123
Notably, in the Brentwood case, the aggrieved party was a parochial school
and not an individual student-athlete. The case underscores the interests of
educational institutions themselves, not just students and their families, in holding
associations accountable for the way they make and enforce rules.
The Brentwood decision was widely viewed as an expansive application of
the state-action doctrine, breaking with decades of narrow Court interpretations. 124
Critics regarded the “entwinement” standard recognized by the majority as both
overly malleable and unnecessary, since the Tennessee association could readily
have been categorized as a state actor under even the more rigorous Blum standard. 125
Though often cited when constitutional claims involve quasi-governmental
entities, the Brentwood ruling has been put to the test only a handful of times in the
context of high school athletics. Two circuits have applied Brentwood to find that
the athletic associations in Michigan and Oklahoma engage in state action for
118. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 299–300.
119. Id. at 300–02.
120. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 843 (1982).
121. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 302–03.
122. Id. at 309–11 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 306 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)); see also id. at 312.
124. See Madry, supra note 27 at 369 (commenting that Brentwood came after almost thirty years of
both the Burger Court and the Rehnquist Court systematically shrinking the state action doctrine and
rejecting efforts by plaintiffs to hold private parties liable under constitutional standards).
125. See Megan M. Cooper, Dusting Off the Old Play Book: How the Supreme Court Disregarded the
Blum Trilogy, Returned to Theories of the Past, and Found State Action Through Entwinement in
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 913, 991
(2002) (criticizing “overly inclusive entwinement test” that, in author’s view, deviated from precedent
and exposed private entities to greater litigation risk).
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purposes of constitutional claims. 126 But in a break with the prevailing view, a
Wisconsin court distinguished Brentwood and found no state action in the state
athletic association’s enforcement of a rule barring a male competitor from a girls’
gymnastics team. 127
In addition to constitutional challenges, the “governmental” status of
HSAAs is regularly tested when federal statutory claims are litigated. These include
the Title IX anti-discrimination statute, which applies to educational institutions
“receiving Federal financial assistance.” 128 Even though the Department of
Education does not directly subsidize the operations of athletic corporations, courts
agree that the associations are bound by Title IX just as their member schools are. 129
Similarly, courts widely agree that athletic associations are “public entities” subject
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which obligates public entities to
reasonably accommodate the access needs of disabled participants. 130 This growing
body of law demonstrates that—outside of the freedom-of-information context—
courts have no difficulty looking beyond the corporate status of HSAAs to their
actual structure, purpose, and function.
While the substance and resolution of claims against HSAAs is beyond the
scope of this article, it is worth noting that, even where plaintiffs succeed in
establishing that athletic associations are state actors, their claims face uncertain
prospects. Courts commonly dismiss due process challenges to HSAA rules or
enforcement actions on the basis that no fundamental right is implicated, either
because education itself is not a constitutionally guaranteed right or because sports
participation is regarded as a luxury not integral to education. 131 In the latter

126. Christian Heritage v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass’n, 483 F.3d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir.
2007); Communities for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676, 692 (6th Cir. 2006).
127. Bukowski v. Wisc. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, No. 2005AP650, 2006 WL 3437313 at *3
(Wis. App. Nov. 30, 2006) (unpublished). The ruling appears to have turned more on the way the plaintiff
chose to litigate the case—relying solely on evidence that the WIAA receives federal subsidies—rather
than a searching inquiry into whether the association is intertwined with state government. See id.
128. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
129. See, e.g., Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265, 272 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that
Kentucky high school association qualifies as a recipient of federal education funding for purposes of
Title IX liability because it acts as an agent of federally funded public schools).
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006) (providing that no individual may be denied the benefit of the
“services, programs, or activities of a public entity” on the basis of disability); Washington v. Ind. High
Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 181 F.3d 840, 846 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying ADA in challenge to Indiana
association’s eligibility standards, brought by learning-disabled student who was held back a grade); see
also John T. Wolohan, Are Age Restrictions a Necessary Requirement for Participation in Interscholastic
Athletic Programs?, 66 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 345 (1997) (surveying cases); Diane Heckman, Athletic
Associations and Disabled Student-Athletes in the 1990s, 143 Ed. L. Rep. 1, 12 nn.52–54 (2000) (same).
131. “State and federal courts have, by a wide margin, rejected the argument that students have a
constitutionally protected property interest in participating in extracurricular activities such as
interscholastic sports.” J.K. v. Minneapolis Public Schools, 849 F. Supp. 2d 865, 875 (D. Minn. 2011);
see also Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n, Inc. v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 228–229 (Ind. 1997)
(“there is no right or interest to participate in interscholastic sports that is entitled to protection under the
federal Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses”); Maroney v. University Interscholastic League, 764
F.2d 403, 406 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that participation in interscholastic athletics is not an interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556, 560 (Tex.
1985) (same); Berschback v. Grosse Pointe Public School District, 397 N.W.2d 234, 241 (Mich. Ct. App.
1986) (same); Makanui v. Dep’t of Education, 721 P.2d 165, 170 (Hi. Ct. App. 1986) (same). For a
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category, a federal appeals court ushered a would-be Texas football player’s claims
out the door with a dismissive wave:
We repeat: we are not super referees over high school athletic
programs. Questions about eligibility for competition may loom
large in the eyes of youths, and even their parents. We do not
disparage their interest in concluding, as here, that these issues are
not of constitutional magnitude. Behind this observation rest
important values of federalism and the reality that the mighty force
of the constitutional commands ought not to be so trivialized. 132
On similar reasoning, a district court in Maryland dismissed the constitutional claims
of students excluded from playing interscholastic sports because, during their offhours outside of athletic participation, they violated a rule against drinking alcohol:
“[The Fourteenth Amendment] protects only liberty and property interests that are
viewed by the courts as of a high enough dignity to warrant due process protection,
and the ability of a high school student to engage in extracurricular activity is simply
not of that dignity.” 133 Recognizing state sports associations as governmental, then,
need not result in undue exposure to constitutional litigation, since courts have
become adept at dismissing challenges on the merits. Indeed, that was the ultimate
fate of the constitutional claims in the Brentwood Academy case, which—in its
second trip to the Supreme Court, six years after the first—ended with a ruling that
the Tennessee association did not violate the Academy’s free-speech or due-process
rights in imposing sanctions for a coach’s overzealous recruiting tactics. 134

contrary view, see the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s decision in Duffley v. New Hampshire
Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 446 A.2d 462, (N.H. 1982), in which the court—relying on New Hampshire
statutes that treat athletics as a “curricular” part of the school day—opined that athletic participation may
not be taken away without procedural due process. See id. at 467. For a more detailed treatment see
Matthew J. Mitten & Timothy Davis, Athlete Eligibility Requirements and Legal Protection of Sports
Participation Opportunities, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 132 –36 (2008) (surveying cases and
concluding that the majority view is that “rendering a student-athlete ineligible to participate in
interscholastic supports does not violate the Constitution”).
132. Hardy v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 759 F.2d 1233, 1235 (5th Cir. 1985).
133. Farver v. Bd. of Educ., 40 F. Supp. 2d 323, 324–25 (D. Md. 1999); see also Rhodes v. Ohio High
Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 939 F. Supp. 584, 589, 591 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (concluding that Ohio sports association
is a state actor, but rejecting student-athlete’s challenge to eligibility rules on the merits, finding that the
rules were of neutral general application and did not discriminate based on student’s disability). A handful
of courts have bucked the general consensus and found that athletic participation is a sufficiently important
interest to entitle a student to procedural due process before the opportunity to participate may be taken
away. See, e.g., Boyd v. Board of Directors, 612 F. Supp. 86, 93 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (finding in favor of a
black football player who was summarily dismissed from football because he engaged in a protest against
perceived racial discrimination in the school’s selection of a homecoming queen).
134. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 551 U.S. 291, 300, 303 (2007).
Nevertheless, the ultimate dismissal of the constitutional claims did not disturb the precedent-setting
determination in Brentwood I that high school associations are state actors that must adhere to
constitutional standards. See id.
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Interpretations applying state freedom-of-information law
1.

Open-government law and high school athletics

While the governmental status of high school associations is regularly
litigated in the context of athlete-rights cases, the issue is less well-developed in the
context of open-government law. “State actor” status for purposes of a constitutional
claim is not decisive of whether an entity is subject to state open-government law. 135
Nevertheless, many of the same legal and public-policy considerations go into both
judgments: is the entity performing a governmental function, under government
supervision, that is imbued with a public interest? So, an entity’s legal status as a
“state actor” is, at the very least, a persuasive factor in considering whether the entity
qualifies as “public” for purposes of state access law. 136
As a starting point, every state recognizes a legal entitlement to inspect the
business records of government entities and to attend the meetings of their governing
boards. These statutes—collectively referred to here as “freedom-of-information” or
FOI laws—start with the strong presumption that agencies should err on the side of
openness and that, accordingly, the courts should broadly construe the public’s right
of access and apply statutory exceptions narrowly. 137 As the Hawaii legislature wrote
in its preamble setting forth the philosophy behind the state’s Uniform Information
Practices Act:
In a democracy, the people are vested with the ultimate decisionmaking power. Government agencies exist to aid the people in the
formation and conduct of public policy. Opening up the
government processes to public scrutiny and participation is the
only viable and reasonable method of protecting the public’s
interest. 138
Open-government laws are intended to promote responsible stewardship of
public dollars and to serve as a check on the abuse of governmental power. 139 As one
federal appeals court observed in the context of a dispute over the right to film police:

135. See ‘Ōlelo: The Corp. for Cmty. Television v. Office of Info. Practices, 173 P.3d 484, 494 (Haw.
2007) (citing and following federal caselaw that “state actor” status for constitutional purposes does not
necessarily equate to “state agency” status for freedom-of-information purposes).
136. Some have argued that it is logical to conflate the two tests. See, e.g., Craig D. Feiser,
Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis of Public Access to Private Entities Under
Federal Law, 52 FED. COMMS. L.J. 21, 59 (1999) (“Arguably, if these [privatized] entities can be termed
‘state actors’ under the Constitution, they should be subject to access as governmental agencies under the
FOIA.”).
137. See, e.g., Office of the Governor. v. Scolforo, 65 A.3d 1095, 1100 (Pa. Commonw. Ct. 2013);
Gannon v. Bd. of Regents, 692 N.W.2d 31, 38 (Iowa 2005); Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ.
of Wash., 884 P.2d 592, 597 (Wash. 1994); Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents,
507 N.W.2d 422, 341 (Mich. 1993); Municipality of Anchorage v. Anchorage Daily News, 794 P.2d 584,
589 (Alaska 1990); Capital Newspapers Div. of the Hearst Corp. v. Burns, 496 N.E.2d 665, 667 (N.Y.
1986).
138. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 92-1 (West, Westlaw through Act 286 of 2019 Reg. Sess.).
139. See DAVID L. CUILLIER & CHARLES N. DAVIS, THE ART OF ACCESS: STRATEGIES FOR
ACQUIRING PUBLIC RECORDS 6 (2011) (“[T]he mere knowledge that records are being kept, and that some
day they will be reviewed, serves to remind stewards of the public till to mind the store.”).
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“Gathering information about government officials in a form that can readily be
disseminated to others serves a cardinal First Amendment interest in protecting and
promoting the free discussion of governmental affairs.” 140 Although the final
decisions of governmental bodies are ultimately made public, access to agencies’
records and meetings enables citizens to have informed input before the decision is
finalized or to figure out after-the-fact what went into the decision. It is therefore
appropriate for disclosure laws to extend to entities that collect and spend public
money or wield governmental authority, regardless of whether they are structured as
“agencies” or as “corporations.”
Every state’s suite of open-government statutes applies to agencies that,
indisputably, are part of state, county, or city government, including public K-12
schools. Those agencies must, at a minimum, make their business records accessible
for public inspection (with recognized exemptions for sensitive confidential
information) and open the meetings of decision-making bodies to public attendance.
To varying degrees, state FOI statutes extend beyond agencies of state, county, and
city government, entitling the public to also obtain records held by private entities
that reflect the performance of governmental functions. 141 At least some courts have
found that conducting athletic competitions is a “governmental” function that is
central to the duties of a public school district. 142
To what extent a private corporation or association can be compelled to
allow public inspection of its business records is a frequent point of dispute reaching
well beyond high school athletics. Disputes are becoming more acute as government
increasingly turns over core state functions to private contractors or does its business
through “authorities,” “special districts,” and other entities with hybrid
public/private characteristics. 143
(a)

Rulings affording the public access to records

In a handful of cases, courts have directly addressed whether state FOI law
applies to the private entities that oversee high school sports. Courts in Massachusetts

140. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotes and citation omitted).
141. Alexa Capeloto of John Jay College of Criminal Justice/City University of New York examined
all 51 open-records statutes in 2013 and found that at least 11 explicitly reach the operations of quasigovernmental entities that “perform a public function,” while 13 others consider the nature of the function
as one among multiple factors. See Alexa Capeloto, Transparency on Trial: A Legal Review of Public
Information Access in the Face of Privatization, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 19, 28–34 (2013).
142. See, e.g., Richards v. Birmingham Sch. Dist., 83 N.W.2d 643, 653 (Mich. 1957), (finding that,
“in allowing athletic competition with other schools,” a school district is “performing a governmental
function vested in it by law”) overruled in part on other grounds, Williams v. City of Detroit, 111 N.W.2d
1 (Mich. 1961).
143. See Craig D. Feiser, Protecting the Public’s Right to Know: The Debate Over Privatization and
Access to Government Information Under State Law, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 833 (2000)
(acknowledging efficiencies that accompany “privatizing” delivery of government services, but observing
that the contractual offloading of responsibility for services “should not come without statutory or
contractual provisions leaving public accountability intact.”); see also Tara Parker, Comment, Private
Prisons Behind Bars: Why Corrections Corporations Must Abide by Public Information Laws, 48 TEX.
TECH L. REV. ONLINE ED. 39, 69 (2016) (calling for legislative reforms to clarify that privatized
correctional institutions must obey public-records statutes as their state-operated counterparts do).
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and Tennessee have required their states’ high school athletic associations to comply
with open-government laws despite their nominally private status.
In Tennessee, reporters from an alternative weekly newspaper in Nashville
submitted requests under the state Public Records Act for documents relating to the
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association’s investigation of a private school
accused of improprieties. 144 The case involved allegations of widespread cheating in
the football and basketball programs of an elite Nashville school, Montgomery Bell
Academy, including improper financial aid to athletes by school boosters and
trustees. 145 The TSSAA insisted that, as a private corporation, it was beyond the
reach of the public records statute. The newspaper sued. 146
Both a trial court and the state Court of Appeals found in favor of the
journalists, relying in part on the Supreme Court’s holding in Brentwood that the
TSSAA is a state actor for constitutional purposes. 147 The appeals court found that
the association’s records qualified under the statutory definition of records “made or
received . . . in connection with the transaction of official business by any
governmental agency.” 148 The “utmost” factor, 149 the court held, was that the
association performs a core public function that would otherwise be performed by a
government agency:
[A] private entity can become subject to the Act if its relationship
with the government is so extensive that the private entity serves
as the functional equivalent of a governmental agency. . . .
‘[W]hen an entity assumes responsibility for providing public
functions to such an extent that it becomes the functional
equivalent of a governmental agency, the Tennessee Public
Records Act guarantees that the entity is held accountable to the
public for its performance of those functions.’ 150
The court found that the association benefited from its quasi-governmental
status in ways that would not be afforded to ordinary nonprofit corporations,
including participation in the state retirement system. 151 Although just two percent
of the association’s annual operating budget came directly from public sources in the
form of school membership dues, the court found that the TSSAA benefited from
millions of dollars in “indirect government funding” by virtue of the exclusive use
of publicly owned facilities to stage the tournaments generating most of its

144. City Press Commc’ns, LLC v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 447 S.W.3d 230, 233 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2014).
145. See Steve Cavendish, What a Three-Year Public Records Fight Revealed About the TSSAA’s
Financial Aid Rules and the School that Broke Them, NASHVILLE SCENE (Nov. 27, 2014, 4:00 AM),
https://www.nashvillescene.com/news/article/13057048/what-a-threeyear-public-records-fight-revealedabout-the-tssaas-financial-aid-rules-and-the-school-that-broke-them [https://perma.cc/EMC9-FX79].
146. City Press, 447 S.W.3d at 234.
147. Id. at 237.
148. Id. at 235 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-503(a)(1)(A) (amended 2018)).
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67, 79
(Tenn. 2002)).
151. See id. at 239.
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revenue. 152 Because all nine members of the association’s board were principals of
public schools, and the state was given two additional ex officio appointments to the
board, the court found the government’s control over the association to be
“substantial.” 153 The court thus analyzed the journalists’ request just as it would
analyze a request for records of a traditional government agency and found the
documents to be non-exempt and publicly accessible. 154
In Massachusetts, a former high school athlete won his legal challenge to
the practice of adjudicating students’ appeals to the Massachusetts Interscholastic
Athletic Association in closed-door proceedings of which the athletes received no
notification. 155 The student, Daniel Hansberry, alleged that the MIAA violated the
state open-meetings statute, which requires a “government body” to admit the public
to its meetings when considering whether he had exhausted his eligibility to play
sports. 156 A superior-court judge agreed, noting that 77 percent of the association’s
members were public schools, themselves governed by the state open-meetings law:
Since the public school committees have collectively delegated
their ability to control athletic programs to the MIAA, and the
MIAA has agreed to act as their agent by performing this important
public function, it adopts the attributes of its principals and is
subject to the same requirements as other governmental bodies. 157
While only a trial-court decision, the reasoning of the Hansberry case is noteworthy
because the judge relied in part on legal authority from the constitutional context,
where it is now almost unanimously agreed that high school athletic associations are
“state actors.” 158
Whether Hansberry’s case continues to set the standard in Massachusetts
today is in doubt, however, due to a contrary and more recent administrative
interpretation. In a 2012 case, the state Public Records Division issued a letter ruling
finding that the MIAA does not qualify as a “public entity” under the state Public
Records Law. 159 The ruling focused on the fact that taxpayers do not directly
subsidize the MIAA through appropriations, that the association was chartered as a
corporation from inception in 1978 and not created by state enactment, and that the
governance of student athletics is not a function reserved exclusively to the state. 160
Although unpublished and without precedential force, the interpretation may provide
legal cover for the Massachusetts association to exclude the public from its
proceedings.

152. Id. at 235–36.
153. Id. at 236–37.
154. Id. at 242.
155. Hansberry v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., No. 95-6807-B, 1998 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 706 (Oct. 21, 1998).
156. Id. at *1.
157. Id. at *8, *10.
158. See id. at *6.
159. Letter of Shawn A. Williams, Supervisor of Records, to Geoffrey R. Bok, Esq., Case No.
SPR12/181 (Sec’y of Commonw., Pub. Rec. Div., Nov. 16, 2012) (copy on file with authors).
160. Id. at 2–3.
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Interpretations from the state attorneys general in Florida and Kentucky
have found their states’ athletic associations to be subject to open-government laws.
In Florida, then-Attorney General Robert A. Butterworth found that the
Florida High School Activities Association must open its board meetings as a
governmental body subject to Florida’s “sunshine law.” 161 The opinion relied on
indicia that the association performs a governmental function under the supervision
of state government. 162 Among those indicia were: (1) the association is recognized
in Florida statutes as the official governing body of interscholastic sports, (2) the
association’s books are reviewed by the state auditor, and (3) the association’s board
composition is dictated by state statute and includes appointees chosen by the state
commissioner of education. 163
Kentucky’s attorney general has, on multiple occasions, ruled that the
Kentucky High School Athletic Association must honor requests for its business
records made pursuant to the Kentucky Open Records Act. 164 In a 1978 opinion, the
attorney general advised that the association board must open its meetings to the
public because it qualifies as a “public agency” for purposes of the Kentucky openmeetings law. 165 Despite its corporate status, the association operates as “an arm of
the State Board of Education, a public agency created by statute,” which is itself
subject to the open-meetings law, the attorney general explained. 166 Because the
governance of interscholastic athletics is a non-delegable duty statutorily assigned to
the Board of Education, the HSAA’s board operates as a de facto “subcommittee” of
the Board of Education, which retains ultimate policymaking authority, the attorney
general wrote. 167
(b) Rulings denying the public access to records
Illustrating the elusive status of athletic associations, Louisiana’s courts
have been on both sides of the transparency issue. In a 1981 ruling, the state Supreme
Court declared the Louisiana High School Athletic Association to be a “public body”
compelled to open its board meetings for public attendance. 168 The court looked to
four primary factors, including (1) that the LHSAA’s own constitution asserted the
authority to control school policy decisions; (2) that membership in the association
was functionally compulsory, since refusing to join would be “tantamount to
obscurity in athletics;” (3) that the association received both direct and indirect
financial support from state government; and (4) that the association’s governing
body was comprised almost entirely of public-school administrators, and the purpose

161. Fla. Att’y Gen., Opinion Letter 98-42 on Sunshine Law, Florida High School Activities Ass’n
(July 14, 1998).
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See Ky. Att’y Gen., Opinion 78-191 (March 1, 1978); Ky. Att’y Gen. Open Meetings Decision
No. 98-OMD-94 (June 1, 1998); Ky. Att’y Gen. Open Records Decision No. 04-ORD-244 (Dec. 21,
2004).
165. Ky. Att’y Gen., Opinion 78-191, supra note 157.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Spain v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 398 So. 2d 1386 (La. 1981), overruled by La. High Sch.
Athletic Ass’n v. State, 2012-1471 (La. 1/29/2013), 107 So. 3d 583 (La. 2013).

112

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 50; No. 1

of the open-meetings statute was to give the public insight into the conduct of public
officials. 169
But the court reversed course in 2013 and vacated its earlier ruling. 170
Perplexingly, the latter case had nothing to do with the public’s interest in attending
association meetings. The open-meetings issue was collateral to a larger debate over
whether the legislature acted unconstitutionally in enacting laws treating the LHSAA
as a public entity, including one requiring the association to open its books to the
legislature’s auditor. In finding those laws unconstitutional, the state Supreme Court
(perhaps unnecessarily) swept aside its 1981 ruling in Spain, finding that the openmeetings law applied only to “committees or subcommittees” of public agencies, not
to private corporations performing government-like functions. 171 Having eliminated
the prior holding that the LHSAA is a “public body,” the court was then free to strike
down the challenged regulatory statutes as inapplicable to a purely private
corporation.
Illinois courts have refused to apply the state’s public-records statute to the
state athletic association. In 2014, the Better Government Association, a nonprofit
advocacy group that employs investigative journalists, sought access to records of
the Illinois High School Association’s contracts for professional services and
applications for vendor licenses. 172 The journalists asserted entitlement to the records
on two related theories: that the IHSA is itself a “public body” under the Illinois
Freedom of Information Act, or that its records are the property of its member public
schools. 173 Illinois’ appellate courts rejected both theories.
The Illinois Supreme Court applied a four-factor analysis to determine
whether a private association could be categorized as a “subsidiary body” of its
public-agency members for purposes of opening its records and meetings: (1) the
extent to which the entity has a legal existence independent of government
resolution, (2) the degree of government control exerted over the entity, (3) the extent
to which the entity is publicly funded, and (4) the nature of the functions performed
by the entity. 174
The journalists pointed out that, hypocritically, the IHSA had asserted an
irreconcilably different position in seeking immunity from tort liability under a
statute that protects “local public entit[ies].” 175 In that case, the association had
emphasized all the ways it is inseparable from its local-government members and
performs a governmental function. 176Applying the immunity statute literally, the
Court of Appeals declined to extend it to a nonprofit entity comprised of
representatives from more than one local entity. 177 But the courts in the Better
Government case found that assertions made in pursuing tort immunity were not
169. Spain, 398 So. 2d at 1390.
170. La. High, 2012-1471 (La. 1/29/2013), 107 So. 3d 583.
171. Id. at 606.
172. Better Gov’t Ass’n v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 2016 IL App (1st) 151356, ¶ 1, 56 N.E.3d 497, 499,
aff’d, 2017 IL 121124, 89 N.E.3d 376.
173. Better Gov’t Ass’n, 2017 IL 121124, ¶ 1, 89 N.E.3d at 379.
174. Id. ¶¶ 34–55, 89 N.E.3d at 386–91.
175. Hood v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 835 N.E.2d 938, 939–40 (Ill. App. 2005).
176. See id. at 940–41.
177. Id. at 942.
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conclusive of the legal determination of whether the IHSA qualifies as a public body
under the open-records law. 178
Similarly, Michigan courts have declined to extend the state open-records
statute to the state high school sports association. In a 2004 ruling, Michigan’s
Supreme Court determined that the Michigan High School Athletic Association
(“MHSAA”) was not required to answer freedom-of-information requests from the
parents of a disqualified student-athlete. 179
The justices looked at the history, structure, and finances of the association
and found that it did not qualify as a “public body” for purposes of the Michigan
Freedom of Information Act, which extends to bodies that are “created by” state or
local law or “funded primarily by” government agencies. 180 The MHSAA, the court
ruled, does not meet either standard. Although initially created as a subunit of the
state Department of Education, the association was spun off in 1972 as a nonprofit
corporation and, in 1995, was removed from state statutes as the officially designated
overseer of interscholastic sports. 181 Because of its reincorporation as a “wholly selfregulated” private corporation, the court found, the Association no longer met the
definition of an entity “created by” statute. 182 About 90 percent of the association’s
revenue comes from ticket sales at sporting event—too indirect, in the court’s view,
to qualify as governmental funding for purposes of the open-meetings act, which
applies only to entities funded “by” or “through” public agencies. 183 Finally, the
court concluded, the Association could not be regarded as functionally equivalent to
a public agency because of the scope of its authority: “Member schools do not
relinquish authority or decision-making capacity to the MHSAA, nor does the
MHSAA have any independent authority over its members.” 184
Central to the Michigan ruling is whether revenues from student athletic
competitions are viewed as belonging to a private oversight organization or
belonging to the participant schools; the Michigan justices believed the former.
However, even their opinion noted that, in some unspecified percentage of games,
the ticket receipts were actually collected by the member schools and then remitted
to the MHSAA. 185 It seems unlikely that ticket-buyers to high school sporting events
believe themselves to be contributing to an independent nonprofit organization rather
than to the competing schools—especially when the schools collect the money.
Moreover, auditors hold schools responsible for managing the ticket revenues they
collect, reinforcing the status of that revenue as “school money,” regardless of where
it ultimately ends up. 186 If associations are benefiting financially from blurring the

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See Better Gov’t Ass’n, 2017 IL 121124, ¶¶ 41–45, 89 N.E.3d at 387.
See Breighner v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 683 N.W.2d 639, 648 (Mich. 2004).
Id. at 644 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.232(d) (1997)).
Id. at 641.
Id. at 647.
Id. at 642, 644.
Id. at 647.
Breighner, 683 N.W.2d at 642.
See, e.g., DETROIT PUB. SCHS., OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN., OFFICE OF HEALTH, PHYSICAL
EDUCATION, SAFETY AND ATHLETICS: CASH RECEIPTS FROM ATHLETIC EVENTS, REPORT NO. 09-209
passim
(Sept.
25,
2009),
http://detroit.k12.mi.us/admin/inspector_general/docs/audit_reports/2009.11.05_Cash_Receipts_from_A
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distinction between themselves and their member schools—that is, if revenues
subsidizing the association are being collected by and for the apparent benefit of
public schools, which remain legally responsible for their management—it is
questionable whether those revenues can fairly be characterized as “private.” 187
Moreover, the majority’s view that the Michigan association does not
exercise authority over its members is difficult to reconcile with the view of the
association’s authority in a long-running federal discrimination case brought on
behalf of female athletes. In that litigation, female students alleged that the MHSAA
purposefully scheduled the seasons for their sports at disadvantageous times,
guaranteeing low attendance and adverse playing conditions, so that boys’ athletic
teams could have the more desirable dates. 188 Relying on the Supreme Court’s
Brentwood case involving MHSAA’s sister association in Tennessee, the Sixth
Circuit found that the Michigan association is a state actor sueable under the federal
Title IX anti-discrimination statute and under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause:
MHSAA, like TSSAA, is comprised primarily of public schools,
and MHSAA’s leadership is dominated by public school teachers,
administrators, and officials. Students at MHSAA-member
schools, like Tennessee students, may satisfy physical education
requirements for high school by participating in MHSAAsanctioned interscholastic sports. Because MHSAA, like TSSAA,
is so entwined with the public schools and the state of Michigan,
and because there is such a close nexus between the State and the
challenged action, MHSAA is a state actor. 189
Two justices in the Breighner case authored a vigorous dissent, pointing out
all the ways in which the association was intertwined with state and local
government. 190 The Michigan association should be regarded as one “created by state
or local authority” because it is indistinguishable from its initial 1924 incarnation as
a vehicle for school districts to organize interscholastic competitions and because
schools agree upon becoming members that they must adopt the regulations of the
association “as their own.” 191 Joining the MHSAA is “voluntary” in name only, the
dissenters wrote, because failure to join and to abide by association rules “would

thletic_Events.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8UF-UV7P] (examining how Detroit schools managed football
ticket sales); see also Jeremy P. Kelley, Dayton Public Schools looks for missing football ticket money,
DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/local-education/daytonpublic-schools-looks-for-missing-football-ticket-money/unaLuDBUYIKsUG9MkRzHPJ/ (reporting that
athletic director resigned after unfavorable audit questioning handling of football ticket money that could
not be accounted for).
187. In its Brentwood opinion, by contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court regarded sharing in the proceeds
of ticket sales from athletic competitions as an indicator of “state actor” status, since the Tennessee
association was piggybacking on the fundraising mechanisms of its member schools. Brentwood
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 299 (2001).
188. Communities for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676, 679 (6th Cir. 2006).
189. Id. at 692 (internal quotes omitted).
190. Breighner, 683 N.W.2d at 648 (Weaver, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 652.
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effectively prevent the schools from participating in interscholastic athletics.” 192
Relying on the Supreme Court’s Brentwood ruling, the dissent found it logically
inconsistent that the same organization could be a “state actor” for constitutional
purposes and yet private for freedom-of-information purposes, which “would
undercut the stated purpose of the FOIA” entitling the public to “full and complete
information regarding the affairs of government.” 193
In Arizona, the state attorney general opined in a 1989 advisory ruling that
the Arizona Interscholastic Association does not qualify as a “public body” under
the state open-meetings statute. 194 The attorney general found that the Association
does not fit the definition of bodies to which the law applies, because it is neither a
“board or commission” of a state agency or political subdivision nor a “multimember governing body” of a state agency or political subdivision. 195 The opinion,
however, was influenced by the Supreme Court’s then-recent pronouncement in the
Tarkanian case that the NCAA does not qualify as a “state actor,” which the attorney
general found to be persuasive as to the status of a high school athletic association—
before the Supreme Court held otherwise in Brentwood Academy. 196 Further, the
attorney general took no note of the provision of Arizona’s open-meetings statute
that seems most applicable to a high school athletic association—defining a “public
body” to include “all corporations and other instrumentalities whose boards of
directors are appointed or elected by the state or political subdivision.” 197 The
Arizona league is, arguably, a corporation with a board of directors appointed by
political subdivisions. Its constitution allocates certain board seats to each
“conference”—a subset of schools apportioned by size and location—and member
schools nominate their administrators for ratification by the Executive Board as
members. 198 The attorney general’s opinion did not acknowledge this feature of the
statute.
This handful of divergent interpretations across the country leaves no clear
consensus as to whether the public may attend the board meetings of high school
192. Id. at 651–52.
193. Id. at 653.
194. See Ariz. Off. Att’y Gen., Opinion Letter on Applicability of Arizona’s Open Meeting Law to the
Board of Directors to the Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n (Jan. 25, 1989), 1989 WL 407502.
195. Id. at 1.
196. See id. at *1 n.2 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988)).
197. See id. at *1 (emphasis added) (citation and footnote omitted) (“The Open Meeting Law, being
applicable only to public bodies, requires us to look to the legislature’s definition of the term ‘public body’
to determine whether the AIA is subject to the law’s provisions. The term ‘public body’ as used in the
statute means: ‘[T]he legislature, all boards and commissions of the state or political subdivisions, all
multi-member governing bodies of departments, agencies, institutions and instrumentalities of the state
or political subdivision, including without limitation all corporations and other instrumentalities whose
boards of directors are appointed or elected by the state or political subdivision. Public body includes all
quasi-judicial bodies and all standing, special or advisory committees or subcommittees of, or appointed
by, such public body.’”).
198. See ARIZ. INTERSCHOLASTIC ASS’N, 2019-2020 CONSTITUTION, BYLAWS, POLICIES, AND
PROCEDURES 15 (2019), http://aiaonline.org/files/14046/2018-2019-aia-constitution-bylaws-policiesand-procedures-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/TKQ9-Y7YG] (explaining that six of 10 governing board
seats are allocated to nominees submitted by athletic conferences comprised of AIA member schools,
while three others are reserved for a school administrator, superintendent and school board member).
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athletic associations or obtain access to their records. Whether public-access laws
apply will depend both on the breadth of the state’s statute (whether it narrowly
applies only to publicly funded entities, or more broadly to those that perform public
functions) and the degree to which the HSAA is tied to or subsidized by state
agencies. This fragmentation of authority points to the need for lawmakers to clarify
the status of athletic associations so that similarly situated entities are held to the
same disclosure rules everywhere. Some have tried.
(c)

Attempts at clarifying the status of HSAAs

In a handful of states where the public’s entitlement to access is uncertain,
lawmakers have tried, with mixed success, to clarify that high school associations
are public bodies for purposes of opening their records and meetings. In California,
the state Interscholastic Federation has been subject to the open-meetings and openrecords law since the 1980s as part of its statutory delegation of authority to
administer interscholastic athletics. 199
Georgia legislators voted in 2000 to require high school sports associations
to comply with open-records and open-meetings laws “to the extent that such records
and meetings relate to the athletic association’s activities with respect to public high
schools.” 200 In Pennsylvania, state legislators voted in 2001 to extend the state openmeetings law to cover board meetings of the Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic
Association. 201 Legislation attempting to bring the Nebraska School Activities
Association within the coverage of state open-government laws was proposed, but
not adopted, in 2000. 202
In states where the legal status of a sports association has not been
established, courts can take guidance from caselaw involving open-government
disputes with other quasi-public organizations. Whether state open-government laws
extend to entities beyond state, county, and city governments varies both with the
nature of the entity and with the scope of each state’s statute.
Some state public-records statutes are understood to cover entities based on
their receipt of public financial support; applying this rationale, the Texas attorney
general has found that nonprofit “community-action” agencies that receive public
money to create jobs are subject to the Texas Open Records Act. 203 Other indicia that
a private entity may be “public” for purposes of state open-government law include:
(1) whether the organization was created by governmental act; (2) whether the
organization is subject to governmental oversight, or is otherwise intertwined with
government agencies; (3) whether the organization performs a duty or function

199. See CAL. ED. CODE § 33353(a)(5) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 860 of 2019 Sess.).
200. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-316(b)(2) (2000).
201. 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 16-1604-A(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess. Act
75).
202. See Legis. Neb. 1021, 101st Leg., 2d Sess. (2010); see also Nicole Ocran, Law Would Subject
NSAA to Open Records, Meetings Regulations, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Feb. 2, 2010),
http://www.splc.org/article/2010/02/law-would-subject-nsaa-to-open-records-meetings-regulations
[https://perma.cc/V943-YHL8].
203. See Byron C. Keeling, Attempting to Keep the Tablets Undisclosed: Susceptibility of Private
Entities to the Texas Open Records Act, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 203, 209 (1989).
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traditionally, or exclusively, associated with government, or (4) whether the
organization exercises powers delegated by the government. 204
The approach taken by Oregon courts is illustrative. There, judges have
looked to federal freedom-of-information law and applied a multi-factor test to
assess whether an entity qualifies as a “public body” that must open its records: (1)
whether it was created by government, (2) whether it performs a traditional
governmental function, (3) whether it has authority to make decisions or merely to
make recommendations, (4) whether it receives direct or indirect government
financial support, (5) whether it operates under government supervision or control,
and (6) whether members of the body are government officials or employees. 205 This
functional approach gives fullest effect to the imperative that open-government laws
apply expansively, defaulting when in doubt toward public access.
While cases involving HSAAs are few, courts and attorneys general have
had occasion to apply open-government law to analogous “membership” entities
comprised wholly or primarily of government agencies or government officials. For
the most part, these entities have been deemed sufficiently “governmental” to require
compliance with open-government laws.
The New Jersey Supreme Court found that a collective body representing
city government officials was a “public agency” subject to the Open Public Records
Act, although chartered as a nonprofit corporation. 206 Among the decisive factors
was that the League of Municipalities received partial funding from the taxpayers
through its members, and that its staff participated in the state retirement benefits
system.
Washington’s Court of Appeals held that two associations of county
appointed and elected officials were quasi-public agencies subject to Washington’s
public records law. 207 Noting that membership dues were paid for by the counties,
some of the associations’ employees were covered by state health insurance, the
associations were under exclusive control of government officials, and the
associations discharged statutorily designated responsibilities (duties that “could not
be delegated to the private sector”), the court concluded, “Although WSAC and
WACO retain some characteristics of private entities, their essential functions and
attributes are those of a public agency.” 208
The Arkansas Supreme Court found that the state’s Freedom of Information
Act applied to the North Central Association of Schools (NCA), a voluntary
association of schools and colleges responsible for school accreditation. 209 Though

204. In his 2000 study, Craig D. Feiser characterizes states’ approaches to records requests from quasipublic entities as either “flexible” or “restrictive.” Within those categories, Feiser finds that the more
flexible states apply a variety of approaches to assessing the nature of the entity at issue, including whether
the entity performs a public function or whether the records themselves are of a governmental nature.
Courts in the more restrictive states look to such factors as whether the entity receives direct support from
taxpayers, or whether the entity was created or chartered by the state. See Feiser, supra note 140, at 836–
60.
205. Marks v. McKenzie High Sch. Fact-Finding Team, 878 P.2d 417, 424–25 (Or. 1994).
206. Fair Share Hous. Ctr. v. League of Municipalities, 25 A.3d 1063, 1065 (N.J. 2011).
207. Telford v. Thurston Cty. Board of Comm’rs, 974 P.2d 886, 888 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
208. Id. at 895.
209. N. Cen. Ass’n of Colls. and Schs. v. Troutt Bros., Inc., 548 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Ark. 1977).
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NCA was a private not-for-profit corporation, membership dues paid by public
schools supported the organization. State personnel were used to carry out the
functions of both organizations, and the association was headquartered in a publicly
owned building. Citing the NCA case, the Arkansas court subsequently held that an
athletic association of public and private colleges—an organization analogous to
high school associations that, like HSAAs, was partly supported by taxpayer
dollars—was subject to the state’s public-records law although chartered as a
nonprofit corporation. 210
Similarly, Missouri’s attorney general ruled that the Missouri School
Boards Association is a “quasi-public governmental body” that must obey the state
open-meetings act, because it performs the public function of oversight of education,
acts primarily through contracts with governmental bodies (county school boards),
and receives membership dues paid with taxpayer money. 211
Breaking from the majority view, Wisconsin’s Court of Appeals declined
to apply the state public-records act to the Wisconsin Counties Association, an
unincorporated organization providing training and advocacy, in support of the
state’s 72 county governments. 212 The decision rested on a technicality in the state
public-records statute, which extends to “quasi-governmental corporations” as well
as to government agencies; since the counties association was not a “corporation,”
the court found that provision inapplicable. 213
The prevailing understanding that nonprofit membership corporations
comprised of local-government entities are state actors performing governmental
functions further supports the position that high school sports associations should be
opening their meetings and records to the public. 214
IV.
A.

A SURVEY OF HSAA ADHERENCE TO OPEN-RECORDS LAW
Methodology and findings

To determine whether state associations believed themselves to be subject
to open-records statutes, Brechner Center researchers sent requests to all 51
associations, requesting copies of the same two sets of the following documents:
1)
The minutes for the most recent available meeting minutes for the
Board of Directors (or the controlling executive body of the organization)

210. Ark. Gazette Co. v. S. State Coll., 620 S.W.2d 258, 259–60 (Ark. 1981).
211. See Mo. Off. Att’y Gen., Opinion Letter No. 103-88 on the Missouri School Board Association’s
Status as a “Quasi-Public Governmental Body” (Dec. 22, 1988), 1988 WL 426897.
212. See Wisc. Prof’l Police Ass’n v. Wisc. Counties Ass’n, WI App 106, ¶ 12, 357 Wis. 2d 715, 855
N.W.2d 715.
213. Id. (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.32(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 21)).
214. In another analogous case, Delaware’s attorney general opined in 2002 that a consortium made
up of school-board members from six different districts who met periodically to discuss issues of school
policy constituted the functional equivalent of a public body for purposes of the state open-records act.
See Del. Att’y Gen., Opinion Letter No. 02-IB19 on Freedom of Information Complaint Against Joint
School Boards of New Castle County (Aug. 19, 2002). Applying the reasoning of Spain v. Louisiana High
School Athletic Ass’n, 398 So. 2d 1386 (La. 1981), the attorney general found that the discussion
committee could be viewed as a “collective committee” or subcommittee of its member school boards.
See id.
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2)
The most current television contract for the rights to broadcast
postseason football games.
Each letter specified the corresponding freedom-of-information statute
specific to each association’s home state. If the initial request letter did not produce
a timely response, the association received at least one follow-up email reminder.
The responses to these requests varied considerably. The table below
organizes the compliance of the agencies into four categories: Full compliance,
partial compliance, declined, and no response.

The “full compliance” category (28 of 51 associations) means that the
HSAA did not withhold any responsive document. It encompasses both associations
that provided documents responsive to both parts of the request (meeting minutes
and television contracts) as well as those that provided minutes but indicated that no
television contract exists. Additionally, an association’s response is categorized as
“fully compliant” if, in its response, the association pointed out the location where
its minutes are posted online in lieu of furnishing a paper copy.
The “partial compliance” category (10 states) includes agencies that
supplied only meeting minutes (or directions to find them online) without providing
the television contract or indicating that no television contract exists. The “declined”
category (four states) includes agencies that expressly declined to fulfill any part of
the request. “No response” (nine states) indicates that, despite at least two attempts,
the HSAA did not acknowledge receipt of the request. 215

215. The request letter was sent with a Florida return address, and for that reason, some entities may
have felt free to ignore it because their state open-records statutes entitle only in-state residents to access.
States with such statutes include Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Louisiana, Missouri, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Tennessee and Virginia. See McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 226 (2013) (enumerating
jurisdictions with in-state preference, which was held to be constitutionally permissible). Of the states

120

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 50; No. 1

Associations that responded with partial compliance, or declined to provide
either of the requested items, offered a variety of justifications. Some explicitly
claimed not to be subject to the state’s open-records laws. Those in this category
generally contended that, because the association is designated as a 501(c)(3) notfor-profit organization and not a government agency, state freedom-of-information
law is inapplicable.
Notably, even 13 of the state associations that cooperated in whole or in
part expressly stated in their replies that they believed their associations to be exempt
from state open-government laws. When combined with the four that explicitly
refused to turn over any documents, and the nine that failed to acknowledge the
request, fully half of the state associations (actively or passively) took the position
that they were not legally required to respond to requests for public records.
Nine of the 18 associations that provided television contracts sent redacted
versions. A majority of the agencies which redacted information from their contracts
claimed these redactions were necessary to protect proprietary information of the
association and/or its broadcast partners. The redacted information typically included
price terms; otherwise, there were with little or no redactions to other substantive
contract details.
Most of the organizations publish the meeting minutes of their governing
executive body on their websites. A review of their websites indicates that 43 of the
51 associations posted the most recent board minutes online. Of the eight agencies
that do not consistently post their minutes or agendas, four are in the practice of
posting the meeting times and locations of their executive board.
B.

Denials and refusals: How well-founded?

Of the associations that explicitly declined to acknowledge that state opengovernment laws extend to their organizations—either through a hedged response or
an outright refusal—some of the denials are solidly grounded in legal precedent
while others are dubiously well-founded. As noted previously, 216 courts in Illinois
and Michigan have declined to apply open-government laws to state high school
associations. But in the remaining holdout states, no legal interpretations explicitly
address the associations’ status. Thus, whether they have a legal duty to comply must
be judged by the scope of the state statute and its applications in other contexts.
The state association in Mississippi, for example, refused to produce
records in reliance on caselaw declining to treat the HSAA as a state agency in a
context other than freedom-of-information law. The association’s denial letter cited
the state Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Mississippi High School Activities Ass’n,
Inc. v. Hattiesburg High School, in which the court held that the MHSAA could not
take advantage of a state statute circumscribing the scope of appellate review of a
“state agency” decision. 217 In that case, the association argued that it was the legal
alter ego of its member schools and entitled to the same deference as a county school
board, but the court found that association was a voluntary nonprofit membership
with a statutory preference for in-state requests, those providing no response were Arkansas, Louisiana,
New Hampshire and Virginia.
216. See supra, Section B.1(b).
217. 2013-CA-01214-SCT, (¶¶ 13–19), 178 So. 3d 1208 (Miss. 2015).
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organization distinguishable from a legislatively chartered school board. 218 But in
other contexts, including constitutional challenges, Mississippi courts have readily
found that the association is governmental in nature because it exercises supervisory
authority delegated by the legislature to school districts and, in turn, to the HSAA. 219
In the absence of any judicial determination applying the Mississippi Public Records
Act, the law is unsettled as to whether the MHSAA qualifies as a “public body” that
must make its records accessible. 220
Iowa’s public-records act extends to all “government bodies,” which the
statute defines to include “this state, or any county, city, township, school
corporation, political subdivision, tax-supported district, nonprofit corporation . . . or
other entity of this state, or any branch, department, board, bureau, commission,
council, committee, official, or officer of any of the foregoing or any employee
delegated the responsibility for implementing the requirements of this chapter.” 221
The act thus specifically contemplates that a private, nonprofit corporation can
qualify as a “government body” for disclosure purposes.
While there is no published authority in the context of the high school sports
association, Iowa courts have extended the open-records act to a somewhat
analogous body, the University of Iowa Foundation, which is the nonprofit
fundraising arm of the state’s largest university. 222 The Iowa Supreme Court found
that, by virtue of its service agreement with a public university, the foundation stood
in the shoes of a governmental body: “As written, Iowa Code section 22.2(2) plainly
extends the Act’s reach to records held by private entities that perform government
duties or functions.” 223
Iowa courts have long recognized that the IHSAA performs governmental
functions and exerts significant authority over the affairs of its member institutions.
In adjudicating a 1972 challenge to the disqualification of a football player caught
riding in a car with a case of beer, the Iowa Supreme Court observed that, in
purporting to enact rules governing the behavior of students, the Association was
exercising authority that the state legislature committed to the discretion of elected
school boards:
What we have here, in fact, is an association which started out
arranging interschool games and tournaments and grew into an
organization above individual schools, regulating all manner of
affairs relating to athletes. The association did not usurp the

218. Id.
219. See Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass’n, Inc. v. Coleman, 631 So. 2d 768, 774 (Miss. 1994) (holding,
in family’s due process challenge to HSAA anti-recruiting rule, that “the Association’s actions, flowing
as they do from statutory authority, are, as this Court and others have implicitly or explicitly found, state
action for the purpose of constitutional analysis”).
220. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-61-3(a) (LEXIS through 2019 legislation) (defining entities covered
by the Public Records Act to include “any department, bureau, division, council, commission, committee,
subcommittee, board, agency and any other entity of the state or a political subdivision thereof, and any
municipal corporation and any other entity created by the Constitution or by law, executive order,
ordinance or resolution”).
221. IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.1 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess.).
222. Gannon v. Bd. of Regents, 692 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Iowa 2005).
223. Id. at 43.
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regulatory functions of individual schools; the schools turned over
those functions to the association. 224
The IHSAA Articles of Incorporation grant the organization “general
supervision over all athletic contests of schools of this Association.” 225 The state
Department of Education has significant involvement in the Association’s
governance. The Association is required to file regular reports with the Iowa
Department of Education, including minutes of its meetings, copies of audit reports,
a list of all members, proposed changes to its constitution or bylaws, and “detailed
reports of all receipts and expenditures.” 226 A Department of Education
representative must be present to oversee HSAA elections and certify the legitimacy
of ballot-counting. 227 The Association is subject to considerable state statutory and
regulatory control beyond what would apply to an ordinary nonprofit corporation,
including limits on fees for rebroadcasting sporting events 228 and constraints on how
HSAA officers are compensated. 229 Perhaps most significantly for purposes of the
Association’s open-government status, all of the Association’s records, without
exception, must be made available to the Department of Education on request. 230
Decisions of the Association affecting student eligibility may be appealed to the
Department of Education, but only after the Association’s own appeal process is
exhausted. 231 Likewise, Association decisions about the conference alignment of
member schools are appealable to the state Department of Education. 232
The law is similarly well-developed In New Jersey, where the state Open
Public Records Act and interpretive caselaw suggest that the New Jersey
Interscholastic Athletic Association (known as the “NJSIAA”) is a sufficiently
governmental body to qualify as an “agency” for purposes of the Act. 233 The state
Supreme Court has found that a nonprofit organization operating high school athletic
competitions engages in “state action” so as to be liable for adherence to the
Constitution, because high school athletics are a substantially public funded
activity. 234
The NJSIAA is integrally intertwined with state government. The
association must have its charter, bylaws, constitution, and regulations approved by
224. Bunger v. Iowa High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 197 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Iowa 1972).
225. IOWA HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, IHSAA HANDBOOK 19 (2019), https://www.iahsaa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/201920IHSAAHandbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6XW-WLGB].
226. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 281-36.3(280), -36.8(280) (2018). The Department of Education can order
audits more frequently than once a year at its direction. Id. -36.10(280). Failing to make the required
financial disclosures to the Department would effectively be fatal to the HSAA, because schools are
forbidden from competing in events organized by noncompliant associations. IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.13
(West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess.).
227. R. 281-36.4(280).
228. IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.13B (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess.).
229. R. 281-36.6(280), -36.7(280).
230. R. 281-36.12(280).
231. R. 281-36.16(280).
232. R. 281-37.3(280).
233. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1.1 (West, Westlaw through L.2019, c. 268 and J.R. No. 22)
(defining a “public agency” to include “any independent authority, commission, instrumentality or agency
created by a political subdivision or combination of political subdivisions”).
234. Christian Bros. Inst. v. N. N.J. Interscholastic League, 432 A.2d 26 (N.J. 1984).
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the state Commissioner of Education. 235 State statutes require the association to
establish postseason competition opportunities for athletes enrolled in programs for
the disabled. 236 State law defers to the NJSIAA to determine what level of gift or
financial assistance to a scholastic athlete is a forbidden inducement. 237 Referees
officiating at NJSIAA-sponsored tournaments enjoy the same governmental
immunity as those employed by public schools at regular-season sporting events. 238
State regulations provide a formal appeal process by which a decision of the
association may be reviewed by the state Commissioner of Education, including a
briefing schedule; an aggrieved party may not appeal to the commissioner without
first exhausting the internal appeal process of the association. 239 Thus,
noncompliance with association formalities is regarded as depriving the state of
jurisdiction to consider an appeal. Further, state regulations circumscribe the
commissioner’s authority in reviewing a decision from the association and require
deference to the association’s determinations of fact and its application of its own
rules, just as if the association was a state administrative agency. 240
In its most recent publicly available tax return, the association reports
receiving $1.53 million in membership dues, out of a total of $4.6 million in
program-service revenue. Annual dues for 2018-19 were set at $2,150 per member
school. 241 The membership of the association is primarily public schools.
While there is no indication that the NJSIAA has been sued for access to its
records, the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered an analogous body, the League of
Municipalities, to comply with OPRA and disclose its records, even though the
League is incorporated as a nonprofit. 242 Based on its entwinement with state and
local government, and the state’s statutory delegation of authority, the NJSIAA is as
“governmental” as the municipal association, which is regarded as a public body for
purposes of OPRA.
In sum, there is substantial basis to believe that at least some state athletic
associations are on wobbly legs in questioning whether open-government laws apply
to them. Nevertheless, in the absence of clear guidance from the courts and uniform
statutory language, it seems inevitable that the “patchwork” approach to public
access will persist.

235. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:11-3 (West, Westlaw through L.2019, c.268 and J.R. No. 22).
236. §§ 18A:11-3.3, 11-3.9.
237. § 18A:36-37.
238. § 2A:62A-6.1.
239. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:3-7.1 (2005). In particular, section 6A:3-7.1(c) provides: “The
Commissioner shall summarily dismiss any petition seeking to appeal a determination of the NJSIAA in
an area that is expressly designated as not appealable by the NJSIAA constitution, bylaws or rules and
regulations as adopted by member schools pursuant to law.” In other words, the association is recognized
as having the authority to determine what decisions are and are not appealable to the state.
240. See § 6A:3-7.5.
241. A copy of the most recent annual dues invoice is available on the association’s website at
https://www.njsiaa.org/sites/default/files/document/2019-2020%20Annual%20Dues%20Invoice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M5KE-8GGH].
242. See, e.g., Fair Share Hous. Ctr. v. League of Municipalities, 25 A.3d 1063 (N.J. 2011).
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Takeaways from the 50-state survey

Because no two-state, public-records statutes are identical, it is unsurprising
that organizations existing in legal “gray areas” might regard themselves as either
covered or not covered, depending on the jurisdiction. Some of the uncertainty stems
from varying statutory definitions, and judicial interpretations, of what constitutes a
public agency that must open its meetings and records. For instance, the Florida open
records law defines an “agency” that must make its records accessible to include:
[A]ny state, county, district, authority, or municipal officer,
department, division, board, bureau, commission, or other separate
unit of government created or established by law . . . and any other
public or private agency, person, partnership, corporation, or
business entity acting on behalf of any public agency. 243
By contrast, Pennsylvania’s narrower open-records law omits any references to
partnerships, corporations or business entities, and defines an “agency” to include
only a “political subdivision, intermediate unit, charter school, cyber charter school
or public trade or vocational school” or a “local, intergovernmental, regional or
municipal agency, authority, council, board, commission or similar governmental
entity.” 244
The survey responses indicate that there is no commonality, or nationwide
consensus, among high school athletic agencies as to the legal question of whether
they are obligated to provide requested records under their respective states’ open
record statutes. This current state of “legal limbo” may lead to inconsistent results
for citizens wishing to gain access to agency records across different states. That two
comparable associations in neighboring states—say, Arizona and Nevada—might
either be fully transparent under state law or completely opaque seems anomalous,
since these organizations all discharge comparable duties and are structured in moreor-less similar ways. If the oversight of high school sports is a matter of public
interest and concern in Tennessee, then it is equally so in Mississippi. Yet a parent
in the latter state would have limited means of exercising oversight over the way
sports are organized and regulated. That athletics are an acknowledged matter of
public concern is illustrated by the fact that nearly all HSAAs post some or all
information about their board meetings online, which may signal that the
associations themselves suspect that their meetings are covered by state opengovernment law.
While minutes of meetings are a relatively benign document that nonprofits
might predictably share without resistance, television contracts are more sensitive;
hence, compliance with that aspect of the request is a better gauge of whether HSAAs
consider themselves bound by state open-records laws.
Only 18 of the 51 agencies provided a copy of a contract for the rights to
broadcast postseason football games. Of the 33 that did not, 10 indicated that either
no such responsive contract existed, or, that such a contract was not yet finalized
243. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.011(2) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.)
244. 65 PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 67.102 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess. Act 91).
Notably, Pennsylvania’s HSAA did comply with the Center’s request for documents even though its
statutory obligation to do so is uncertain.
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between the agency and the broadcaster. Another 10 explicitly declined to provide
an existing contract, and 13 did not address the contract request whatsoever. Even of
the 18 agencies that provided a version of their existing contract, the majority
withheld some of the information—and one, the University Interscholastic League
of Texas, redacted essentially the entire document top-to-bottom, rendering it
meaningless. The UIL insisted that the redactions were necessary to protect the trade
secrets of its contracting partners, Fox Sports South, and High Field Marketing. 245
Television contracts are of public interest for many reasons. They set forth
all the essential terms by which state associations (and in states where there are
revenue-sharing arrangements, the schools themselves) will be compensated for the
right to air student performances. They also address advertising and marketing
guidelines, recording and distribution rights, insurance requirements and sponsorship
regulations, among other subjects. Of special public impact, these contracts
determine how much of any postseason athletic event may be accessible to news
media coverage and to the viewing public at home. 246
At times, conflicts have arisen over journalists’ ability to effectively cover
postseason athletic events. 247 Because the state HSAA is typically the entity
responsible for issuing credentials affording journalists access to the press box and
sidelines, associations are in a position to impose conditions on coverage that, at
times, may interfere with journalists’ ability to present a complete and accurate
story. 248 As one commentator has observed:
Broad clauses referring to the association’s right to deny or revoke
credentials without cause or for a media representative’s improper
conduct can easily lead to implied editorial restrictions. Out of fear
of losing access, media representatives may self-censor reports so

245. See Letter of Tex. Assistant Att’y Gen. Matthew Taylor to Ana Vieira Ayala, Office of Gen.
Counsel, Univ. of Tex. Sys. (Oct. 10, 2018) (copy on file with authors) (explaining rationale for
redactions).
246. For one such clash between public access and profit, see Scott Leber, IHSA Games Pulled from
Free TV, MYSTATELINE.COM (Sept. 26, 2017, 5:21 AM), https://www.mystateline.com/sports/ihsagames-pulled-from-free-tv/818579620 [https://perma.cc/V4HW-GVVB] (quoting disappointed fans who,
for the first time since 1974, were unable to watch Illinois postseason games, including those in which
their own children paid, on free over-the-air television).
247. See Calzada, supra note 52; see also John Naughton, IHSAA Seeking ‘Better Solution’ for Limited
MOINES
REG.
(Feb.
7,
2017,
5:14
PM),
Boys
TV
Coverage,
DES
https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/sports/high-school/2017/02/07/ihsaa-seeking-better-solutionlimited-boys-tv-coverage-iowa-state-championships/97599492/
[https://perma.cc/LA27-3P8Q]
(describing fan dissatisfaction with limited ability to view prep boys’ football, basketball and wrestling,
because exclusive rights-holder’s coverage is not accessible in many parts of the state). In North Carolina,
for example, broadcasters must apply to the high school athletic association for permission to air, live or
on delay, postseason football or basketball games and—only if the exclusive rights-holder declines to air
the game—the rights may be purchased for a fee of several hundred dollars. See Broadcast Request Forms,
HIGH
SCH.
ATHLETIC
ASS’N,
https://www.nchsaa.org/broadcast-request-forms
N.C.
[https://perma.cc/PDA9-9LD4].
248. See Newman, supra note 41, at 62–64 (describing how some HSAAs have reserved unbridled
discretion to revoke journalists’ credentials at any time for any reason, and how some HSAA credentialing
conditions require broadcasters to avoid negative or controversial subject matter).
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they are not criticizing event participants or discussing athlete
injuries. 249
In addition to the action on the field, news regularly happens at high school sporting
events; there may be fights, protests, or allegations of dishonest or unsportsmanlike
behavior. 250 Whether public schools are, through a state association, contracting
away the ability of local journalists to fully cover these events is a matter of public
interest and concern.
When the public’s only source of coverage is the high school athletic
association and its contracted broadcast partner, the coverage may be sanitized and
lack journalistic objectivity. Some state associations have issued directives
instructing broadcasters to avoid mentioning policies of a “controversial nature” or
to refrain from “objectionable comments such as criticism of an official, coach, team,
player, school or other entity.” 251 For instance, the Pennsylvania Interscholastic
Athletic Associations’ policy for telecasting or webcasting postseason games
encourages the announcers to shade their coverage to emphasize the positive and
minimize the negative: “[I]t is respectfully requested that the media of
communication refrain from making negative comments towards participants,
Coaches, or Contest officials; and report acts of good sportsmanship without giving
undue publicity to unsportsmanlike conduct.” 252 The same document purports to
restrict what non-rightsholder media outlets, such as local newspapers and TV
stations covering the game, may do with their video and photos, forbidding them
from either selling images (or even giving away copies for free) without permission,
and limiting them to publishing no more than 90 seconds of game footage only after
each game is concluded. 253 Thus, HSAA exclusivity agreements have real

249. Id. at 64.
250. Controversy regularly arises over demonstrations by fans, over violence on the field or in the
stands, and over political or religious expression to which fans are exposed. In 2015, an assistant football
coach was accused of instructing two players to crash into a referee, an episode that received national
media coverage and led to a criminal assault investigation. See Ken Rodriguez, Hearing Raises More
Questions in Football Referee Attack Investigation, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 15, 2015),
https://www.si.com/high-school/2015/10/15/referee-attack-investigation-hearing-texas-high-schoolfootball-robert-watts [https://perma.cc/HZ3U-645F]. For other memorable incidents, see also Tim
Stevens, Abusive Fans Make It Tougher to Recruit High School Sports Refs, NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar.
25, 2016, 11:55 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/sports/high-school/article68495447.html
[https://perma.cc/H95S-J57K] (noting that some states have experienced shortages in referees to officiate
games, blamed in part on increasing aggressiveness in fans verbally or even physically attacking officials);
Jeremy P. Kelley, Fan Behavior Has Teams, Schools, Arenas on Alert, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Jan. 13,
2016),
https://www.daytondailynews.com/sports/fan-behavior-has-teams-schools-arenasalert/6wyyzhtny1xzQ9U8HjuRQP/ [https://perma.cc/QZN6-TLCL] (“[B]ad fan behavior isn’t confined
to professional sports. It extends all the way down to high school and youth leagues, where administrators
have had to take extreme measures in some cases to protect players and the public.”); and Calzada, supra
note 52, at 11 (“While sporting events are often considered entertainment, they are also news.”).
251. See Newman, supra note 41, at 64 (quoting restrictive conditions imposed by broadcasting
agreements in Texas and Florida).
252. PA. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2019-2020 PIAA POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 101,
https://www.piaa.org/assets/web/documents/Handbook%20-%20Section%20II%20%20Policies%20and%20Procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/33J4-J9UH].
253. See id. at 103.

Winter 2020

SHOW US THE MONEY

127

consequences on the public’s ability to be informed about athletic competitions and
on journalists’ ability to provide complete coverage. 254
To the extent that state associations are perceived as exercising “delegated”
governmental authority, the argument for public access becomes easier. It is widely
recognized that, when the state delegates its authority to a nominally private entity,
the obligation to obey state transparency laws travels with the grant of authority. 255
In some states, the delegation of authority to the state HSAA is explicit. For instance,
Washington law expressly provides that a county school board “may delegate
control, supervision and regulation of any such activity to the Washington
interscholastic activities association or any other voluntary nonprofit entity and
compensate such entity for services provided,” subject to certain statutory
conditions, including the right to appeal HSAA decisions through internal district
channels as if the decision had been made directly by the school board. 256 Since
decisions of the Washington Interscholastic Activities Association are regarded as
having been made under the authority of the school district and carrying the
delegated authority of the district, it cannot seriously be maintained that its decisions
are “private” matters. 257
Some legal interpretations conclude that the supervision of athletics is so
central to the duty of a school or a district that the responsibility cannot be delegated
to a third party. For example, South Carolina’s attorney general found that, even
though the nonprofit South Carolina High School League was statutorily given
responsibility for implementing state academic standards, the statute did not
unlawfully “delegate” state enforcement powers to a private entity, because the state
retained its ultimate authority to establish and enforce standards. 258 Similarly,
Michigan’s attorney general found that, because athletics are a “governmental
education function vested in school districts by law,” school districts could not
delegate “supervision and control” over athletics to a private high school association;
consequently, HSAA rules have no binding force unless ratified by member
districts. 259 That the athletic associations in those states may not technically be
exercising delegated state authority—because the authority is non-delegable—may
254. See Newman, supra note 41, at 67 (citing Arizona and Florida as examples of states where HSAA
credentialing conditions require broadcasters to avoid “negative” coverage, arguably in contravention of
the First Amendment’s prohibition against prior restraints and viewpoint-based discrimination).
255. See, e.g., Smith v. Northside Hosp., Inc., 807 S.E.2d 909 (Ga. 2017) (deciding that private
operator of publicly owned hospital was subject to state open-records act because it was performing a
public service or function in service of a government agency); SWB Yankees LLC v. Wintermantel, 45
A.3d 1029 (Pa. 2012) (ruling that Pennsylvania Right-to-Know Law applies to private contractor that was
delegated municipal authority to operate city-owned baseball stadium); Evertson v. City of Kimball, 767
N.W.2d 751 (Neb. 2009) (finding that private investigator’s report commissioned by city government was
a public record because investigator was delegated governmental authority).
256. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.600.200 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
257. For another example of explicit statutory delegation, see W.VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-25
(LexisNexis through 2019 legislation) (statutorily constituting the West Virginia secondary school
activities commission and specifying its membership and duties: “The West Virginia secondary school
activities commission is hereby empowered to exercise the control, supervision and regulation of
interscholastic athletic events and band activities of secondary schools, delegated to it pursuant to this
section.”).
258. 1985 ATT’Y GEN. ST. S.C. ANN. REP. AND OFFICIAL OPINIONS 237, 237.
259. 1977–1978 MICH. ATT’Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 190, 192, 196.
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cut against treating them as state entities for freedom-of-information purposes. On
the other hand, if the HSAA is exercising delegated authority in all but name—if the
association is formulating the rules, which its members ministerially “ratify” but
have no ability to vary—then these cases may cut in favor of greater transparency,
because they recognize that the oversight of athletics is a core governmental function
too important to delegate.
As a final postscript to the survey findings, it is worth noting that an
association’s willingness to provide rather benign records in response to a request
from university researchers does not necessarily mean that citizens will experience
the same level of cooperation when requesting more sensitive documents or seeking
to attend an association’s board meeting when issues of controversy are deliberated.
When the reputational stakes are higher, the incentive to conceal becomes greater,
and agencies may be more inclined to take aggressive legal positions and risk being
sued. Since many associations already post their board minutes online, asking for
copies of those minutes was a low-stakes request as opposed to, for example, asking
to see vendor contracts, employee emails, or travel reimbursements—all documents
that unquestionably would be public record at an ordinary state agency. 260 The
findings of the Center’s survey should (with the exception of the handful of states
that may have withheld cooperation on the grounds of state residency) probably be
regarded as a high-water mark of cooperation.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As this article was being prepared in the fall of 2018, witness after witness
was taking the stand at a federal district courthouse in Manhattan, testifying about
what one reporter called “a shady world of bagmen, secret payments and bags of
cash” that permeates big-time college basketball. 261 A three-year FBI investigation,
which resulted in criminal charges against four major-college assistant coaches,
lifted the lid on how money permeates the supposedly amateur world of college
sports, including inducements to the families of sought-after student recruits. 262
How educational institutions respond to the unfolding revelations that
coaches, agents and corporate sponsors routinely offer money to high school athletes
and their families is a matter of self-evident public concern. At such a time, it is
especially difficult for those who manage interscholastic athletics to justify shutting
the public out from the boardroom where decisions are made.

260. For a discussion of the scope of records obtainable via state freedom-of-information request, see
David L. Cuillier & Charles N. Davis, THE ART OF ACCESS: STRATEGIES FOR ACQUIRING PUBLIC
RECORDS 41–42 (2011).
261. John Marshall, Federal Trial Pulls Back Curtain on Basketball Recruiting, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Oct. 7, 2018), https://apnews.com/dce361999e7041ceb879c09d24eb3722 [https://perma.cc/5BY64BQR].
262. See generally Matt Norlander, College Basketball Corruption Trial: Former Adidas Consultant
Says He Paid 5 Recruits’ Families, Including Deandre Ayton’s, CBSSPORTS.COM (Oct. 10, 2018, 5:56
PM),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/college-basketball-corruption-trial-formeradidas-consultant-says-he-paid-5-recruits-families-including-deandre-aytons [https://perma.cc/NZ8QVPP9] (recapping trial testimony from former shoe-company executive who admitted paying inducements
to family of Louisville basketball recruit).
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High school sports have been called “pivotal” to young people’s
educational development, affording many thousands of participants a pathway to a
college education that might otherwise be beyond their reach. 263 As illustrated by the
many dozens of legal challenges implicating high school associations’ status as
“state actors,” these associations make life-altering decisions both for individual
athletes and for schools. When a school like Brentwood Academy is denied
membership in an HSAA or is disqualified from competing for a championship, the
school’s stakeholders—and the general public—have a right to know why.
High school sports, football in particular, are an enormously complex
financial enterprise. Oversight of this enterprise is, manifestly, the public’s business.
Every aspect of high school athletics is intertwined with state-and-local government,
including the involvement of government-built facilities and government-salaried
coaches. In states where the legal status of these associations is unsettled, legislators
should clarify that HSAAs are public entities subject to the same disclosure laws that
apply to their public-school members.
If it is accepted that open-government laws can at times apply to entities
beyond traditional state, county, or city agencies, 264 it is difficult to think of a
nominally private entity that is more entwined with government than a high school
athletic association. Associations often owe their existence to state legislation 265 and
make decisions reviewable by state government bodies. 266 Many are subject to state
financial or performance auditing, just as school districts are. 267
While the structure of state associations varies, a common feature of each
is that it exerts regulatory authority over public schools, their employees, and their

263. See Van Ann Bui, Varsity Blues: A Call to Reconfigure the Judicial Standard for High School
Athletic Association Transfer Rules, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 231, 256–57 (2011) (enumerating the value
of sports to individual students: “They help build self-confidence, encourage teamwork and healthy
competition and help develop a myriad of other leadership skills. . . . Participation in interscholastic
athletics also offers opportunities for students to receive athletic scholarships or, at the very least, to
include the activities in their applications.”).
264. See, e.g., State ex rel. Freedom Comm’n, Inc. v. Elida Cmty. Fire Co., 697 N.E.2d 210, 212
(1998) (observing that, for purposes of Ohio’s public-records statute, “[a]n entity need not be operated by
the state or a political subdivision thereof to be a public office. . . . The mere fact that [a firefighting
organization] is a private, nonprofit corporation does not preclude it from being a public office.”).
265. See, e.g., Jane Hefferan, Changing Seasons, Changing Times: The Validity of Nontraditional
Sports Seasons Under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 861, 870
(2007) (observing that Michigan’s high school association was created by state legislation “as an official
state organization,” and that, although subsequently chartered as a corporate entity, “this modification did
not substantially change either the structure or the operation”).
266. See, e.g., Patrick Sterk, To Pray or to Play: Religious Discrimination in the Scheduling of
Interscholastic Athletic Events, 18 SPORTS L.J. 235, 246 47 (2011) (describing the entanglement between
Oregon’s high school association and the state, including an appeal process by which HSA decisions are
statutorily appealable to the State Board of Education).
267. See MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC., REPORT ON THE MINNESOTA STATE HIGH SCHOOL LEAGUE (2018);
see also STATE OF N.C., OFFICE OF STATE AUDITOR, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, NORTH CAROLINA HIGH
SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, INC. (2009); STATE OF UTAH, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR,
REPORT NO. 2014-01, A PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE UTAH HIGH SCHOOL ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION
(2014). In 2018, Tennessee enacted a statute requiring the state athletic association to undergo an annual
audit by the Comptroller of the Treasury or to submit an independent audit satisfactory to the Comptroller.
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-416 (2018).
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students. 268 If a school or its coaches are found to be in violation of HSAA rules,
their teams can be excluded from postseason play or forced to forfeit games. 269
Associations have the authority to overrule decisions made by public agencies; for
instance, a school or a district may decide that Johnny qualifies to compete in
interscholastic sports, but the association can override that determination. 270 This
distinguishes athletic associations from other private entities with which schools do
business. Unlike a vendor or contractor relationship, a school is not free to “take its
business elsewhere.” If not legally compulsory, membership is de facto compulsory
for any school that competes in interscholastic athletics. 271
While it has been argued that associations are merely club-like associations
whose members voluntarily contract away some autonomy, so that an HSAA is more
akin to a contractor than a regulator, 272 that view is unpersuasive in view of the fact
that HSAA regulations extend to students as well as their schools. Student-athletes
are compelled to obey HSAA-imposed grooming and dress standards, refrain from
certain prohibited types of expression, and refrain from taking performanceenhancing drugs or accepting compensation. 273 Neither students nor their parents

268. In later proceedings following the Supreme Court’s landmark Brentwood Academy decision, the
Sixth Circuit emphasized that the role of Tennessee’s high school association was a “regulatory” one
rather than just a contractual provider of services. See Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary Sch.
Athletic Ass’n, 442 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he appropriate characterization of the TSSAA’s
role is as a government regulator, a context to which the First Amendment surely applies.”).
269. See, e.g., Shaddi Abusaid, Marietta High Must Forfeit 2017 Wins, MARIETTA (GA.) DAILY J.
(July 23, 2018), https://www.mdjonline.com/news/marietta-high-must-forfeit-wins/article_d3cf4ce08ecf-11e8-b674-5b50f45a4b54.html [https://perma.cc/XCB9-KQ52] (reporting that Georgia High School
association ordered high school to forfeit football wins and placed school on disciplinary probation after
discovering recruiting violations); Rick Peterson, Topeka High Ordered to Vacate Football Wins for
CAP.-J.
(Jan.
18,
2018,
6:13
AM),
Using
Ineligible
Player,
TOPEKA
https://www.cjonline.com/sports/20180117/topeka-high-ordered-to-vacate-football-wins-for-usingineligible-player [https://perma.cc/JJ2J-4NDN] (describing forfeits and other sanctions levied by Kansas
State High School Activities Association after football team was caught using ineligible player); A. Stacy
Long, Lee Generals Shocked, Saddened at Forfeits, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, (Oct. 24, 2016, 4:40
PM),
https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/sports/high-school/football/
2016/10/24/leegenerals-shocked-saddened-ahsaa-forfeits/92695714/ [https://perma.cc/Z37Y-3FTF] (reporting that
Alabama High School Athletic Association forced high school team to forfeit all of its season’s football
victories for playing an ineligible player in violation of association residency rules).
270. See, e.g., In re M.D. & Cardinal Spellman High Sch., Case #02-3997 at 3, 5 (Mass. Bureau Spec.
Ed. Appeals, Dec. 9, 2002) (declining to offer relief to track-and-field athlete whose request for a disability
accommodation was refused by her school on the grounds that the school was bound by Massachusetts
Interscholastic Athletic Association rules governing practices protocols, and that violating MIAA rules
could result in the entire team being declared ineligible for competition).
271. See Bunger v. Iowa High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 197 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Iowa 1972) (“To say that a
school can withdraw from [the association] is no answer. If it leaves [the association] voluntarily, or
involuntarily for violating the rule, its boys’ interscholastic athletic program is at an end . . . . Its hands
are tied.”).
272. See, e.g., Madry, supra note 27, at 391 (remarking, in analyzing the Supreme Court’s conclusion
in Brentwood that the Tennessee athletic association was a state actor, that “[t]he only authority that the
TSSAA had over its members was contractual, and that was true for public as well as private schools.”).
273. See, e.g., FHSAA Adopts PED, Enrollment, Mediation Changes to Protect Student-Athletes and
Fair Play, FLA. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.fhsaa.org/news/2014/0114
[https://perma.cc/XV8V-4NDR] (describing new bylaw that declares students ineligible for athletic
competition if they use human-growth hormone, or HGH, for performance-enhancing purposes); IOWA
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have contracted to become “members” of the state high school association “club.”
Even if the school is itself free to belong or not to belong—and whether that freedom
is real or illusionary is debatable—students are given no such choice. 274 Hence,
HSAAs are more analogous to government regulatory entities than to private clubs.
As illustrated by the broadcast-rights contracts commonplace throughout
the country, high school associations have authority to enter into agreements
contractually binding on their member schools. A high school in Illinois or Iowa
would not be free to schedule a televised postseason football game in competition
with the games organized by their associations. Nor would two competitor schools
be free to invite their local television stations to carry live play-by-play coverage of
the games in contravention of the contracts’ exclusivity provisions. This delegation
of contractual authority distinguishes the HSAA relationship from a traditional
service-provider relationship.
Further, associations are afforded preferential use of state resources that
would never be made available to a non-state entity. They are permitted to use stateowned facilities to stage ticketed events from which they retain the proceeds. 275 Their
“business model” is based on procuring the uncompensated labor of students to stage
commercially valuable performances (as courts have characterized postseason
athletic tournaments). 276 It is only because athletic associations are inseparable in
identity from their member schools that schools are willing to—and legally permitted
to—allow the associations to share in powers and benefits otherwise reserved to the
government. Even where associations are not directly subsidized by payments from
school districts, they benefit indirectly from public support in a variety of ways,
including drawing on the government-paid time of the public school superintendents,
principals, and athletic directors who make up their boards and committees. 277
HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 216, at 27 (providing that a student may receive an award worth
no more than $50 from his or her school without forfeiting amateur status and becoming ineligible to
compete in athletics, but may not accept a prize in the form of cash).
274. See Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc. v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 230 (Ind. 1997) (finding
that, although the judiciary should refrain from second-guessing the management decisions of private
associations in internal disputes among members, the same deference does not apply to challenges brought
by nonmembers: “as a student, [the plaintiff] has not voluntarily subjected himself to the rules of the
IHSAA; he has no voice in its rules or leadership”).
275. On this point, see the Tennessee Court of Appeals’ analysis in City Press Communications, LLC
v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 447 S.W.3d 230, 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014), finding that
the preferential use of state facilities for revenue generation represents an indirect government subsidy.
276. See Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co., 658 F.3d 614, 622 (7th Cir. 2011)
(referring to high school sporting events as an “entertainment product that WIAA has created”). Indeed,
the Michigan High School Athletic Association has unabashedly touted the opportunity to influence
students as an inducement for businesses to purchase sponsorships. See Corporate Partner Program,
MICH. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, https://www.mhsaa.com/About-the-MHSAA/Corporate-PartnerProgram [https://perma.cc/QB4F-Z56Q] (touting benefits of corporate sponsorship packages for MHSAA
tournaments: “a partnership provides access to a state-wide population of student-athletes and families
from ages 14-18 and 18-54 from various ethnic, cultural, and socioeconomic backgrounds. A partnership
can provide a sense of support from your brand to a student, peer, and/or family member by enhancing
their experience. The recognition by your brand on the importance of high school athletics will create a
statewide sentiment and will maximize brand awareness of a company’s products and/or services.”).
277. See Trevino, supra note 64, at 305 (pointing out that school officials attend meetings of the
Wisconsin association during the workday, so that “the State is essentially paying the WIAA committee
members to attend.”).
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Athletic associations embrace their “governmental” status when that status
is strategically advantageous. 278 For instance, when decisions of state associations
are challenged, courts have sometimes afforded HSAA corporations the same
deference that would be afforded to the Department of Education or another
administrative adjudicatory agency. 279 Governmental status is not a raincoat that may
be donned and shed opportunistically; if an HSAA wishes to enjoy the benefits of
being a state entity, then the association can fairly be held to state transparency and
accountability standards.
The athletic operations of a single public school undeniably are subject to
the open-records laws of the state. 280 Equally, state open-records laws would apply
if two public schools pooled their resources to organize an athletic event together. If
high school athletic operations are a matter of public record whether conducted
individually or in collaboration, it is counterintuitive that athletics alchemically
become private when hundreds of schools share resources to create a management
company to handle their responsibilities. This is doubly so because athletics are
accepted to be a matter of public record until the point at which public interest is the
highest: The championship round, where the HSAA typically takes over governance
from the individual competitor schools. Open-government laws should recognize the
commonsense proposition that, if an activity is subject to public scrutiny when done
by a single government entity—a school board, a county commission, a city
council—then it is equally subject to public scrutiny when performed by a
consortium of government entities, notwithstanding the veneer of private
incorporation.
Because of the unique status and function of HSAAs, there are no
significant downsides in applying open-government laws. If a genuinely private
corporation—for instance, a construction company that accepted a contract to build
a state building—were held to be subject to state open-government laws, the
corporation might have legitimate confidentiality concerns. Its strategic business
plans might become known to competing construction companies. The company
might even leave the state and take its business elsewhere. There are no comparable

278. See M. Chester Nolte, Judicial Intervention in School Athletics: The Changing Scene, 8 ED. L.
REP. 1, 9 (1983) (“High school athletic associations, having both the discretion of a voluntary association
and the discretionary power of school boards, have a dual protection from judicial intervention.”).
279. See, e.g., Clay v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 779 P.2d 349, 350 (Ariz. 1989) (treating HSAA as
the equivalent to a state agency for purposes of judicial deference, so that agency’s decision can be
overturned only if it is found arbitrary and capricious).
280. See, e.g., State ex rel. Plain Dealer Pub. Co. v. Lesak, 457 N.E.2d 821 (Ohio 1984) (ordering
school to produce records of bank accounts containing gate receipts and school entry fees from athletic
tournaments, program and concession sales); State of Ill. Pub. Access Op. No. 14-007, 2014 WL 4407593
(Ill. A.G. Aug. 14, 2014) (opining that Chicago Public Schools violated Illinois freedom-of-information
law by failing to act diligently to fulfill request for records of ticket receipts for athletic events; Ky. Op.
Att’y Gen. Open Records Decision 06-ORD-061 (Mar. 17, 2006), 2006 WL 1315760 (finding that
anonymous misconduct complaint against high school basketball coach was a public record that should
have been retained by school district and not destroyed); Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion Letter No. 2001-147,
2001 WL 608467 (May 30, 2001) (advising that “memoranda, letters and notes produced by school district
officials” in possession of junior high school coach should be turned over in response to request from
journalists investigating recruiting improprieties in Little Rock school athletics).
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risks with HSAAs. 281 Moreover, like any other governmental entity, an athletic
association could invoke the many statutory exemptions recognized in state freedomof-information law to redact or even entirely withhold records containing
legitimately confidential information, such as attorney-client privileged
communications or student academic records. 282
Clarifying that collaboratives made up of government agencies or
government officials must obey state open-government laws would have benefits
beyond high school sports. Disputes regularly arise over the legal status of other
governmental umbrella organizations, including those representing cities, school
boards, and school administrators. 283 Common to all of these entities is that they
receive substantial financial support from taxpayers—often in the form of dues paid
by their members out of public money, as well as indirect subsidies—and that their
membership is wholly or largely limited to those wielding governmental authority.
When government officials or governmental bodies pool resources to conduct
business that would be public if done by a single governmental entity, the activity
does not shed its “public” nature merely by the ministerial step of incorporation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

From desegregation in the 1960s to transgender rights in the present day,
the social and political issues of the current moment have always played out on the
stage of high school sports. At this moment, disputes are simmering across the
country over whether undocumented students, who have a constitutional right to
attend public school, can be excluded from interscholastic athletics because of
HSAA regulations that require proof of citizenship. 284 High school sporting events
are perhaps one of the last American “melting pots” where people of diverse
backgrounds, cultures, and beliefs come together around a shared interest, at least
for a few hours each Friday in the fall. 285 For that reason, the governance of high
281. Indeed, some of the most sensitive information that a truly private business would be interested
in protecting, such as its managers’ compensation packages and the size of its largest vendor contracts, is
already public in the case of HSAAs because federal tax law requires 501(c) nonprofit corporations to
make their tax returns public by way of the annual IRS 990 form. Moreover, as the U.S. Supreme Court
recently reemphasized in a case involving the federal analog to state open-records laws, ample exemptions
already exist for private entities to protect commercially valuable “trade secrets” from disclosure in
response to requests for government documents. See Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct.
2356 (2019) (enabling state regulators to invoke “trade secret” rights of grocery retailers to decline federal
Freedom of Information Act request for statistics about revenues from food stamps). With the availability
of commodious “trade secret” exemptions, there is no compelling reason why an HSAA needs blanket
impunity from disclosing any-and-all of its records.
282. For a comprehensive state-by-state survey of the categories of records that must, or may, be
withheld from public disclosure, see NAT’L ASS’N OF COUNTIES, OPEN RECORDS LAWS: A STATE-BYREPORT
(2010),
https://www.governmentecmsolutions.com/files/124482256.pdf
STATE
[https://perma.cc/VCK2-RMQV].
283. See generally Fair Share Hous. Ctr. v. League of Municipalities, 25 A.3d 1063 (N.J. 2011);
Telford v. Thurston Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 974 P.2d 886 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
284. See generally Casey Parks, Immigrant Students Find Hope in Soccer, but Some States Won’t Let
Them Play, HECHINGER REP. (Nov. 7, 2018), https://hechingerreport.org/immigrant-students-find-hopein-soccer-but-some-states-wont-let-them-play/ [https://perma.cc/2E6C-DZJT].
285. See Morgan Shell, Transgender Student Athletes in Texas School Districts: Why Can’t the UIL
Give All Students Equal Playing Time?, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1043, 1053 (2016) (enumerating personal
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school athletics cannot exist in a sealed bubble impervious to public scrutiny and
accountability. The tournaments overseen by high school athletic associations—
events built on the backs of unpaid student laborers—are not the “exclusive
property” of private promoters. They belong, in a deeper cultural sense, to their
communities they enrich—communities that are entitled to know whether sporting
events are managed honestly, efficiently, and safely.

and societal benefits of interscholastic sports participation, including promoting teamwork, self-esteem
and regard for diversity).

